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INTRODUCTION 
Every contemporary American lawyer who has engaged in litigation is 
familiar with the now fifty-four-volume treatise, Federal Practice and 
Procedure.1 Both of that treatise’s named authors, Charles Alan Wright and 
Arthur Miller,2 have mourned the death of a Federal Rules regime that they 
spent much of their professional lives explaining and often celebrating. 
Wright shared a sense of gloom about federal procedure that he compared 
to the setting before World War I.3 Miller has also published a series of 
articles that chronicled his grief.4 
 
1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d 
ed. 1987). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg praised the treatise as “by far the most-cited treatise in the 
United States Reports; it has been called the procedural Bible for federal judges and those who 
practice in our federal courts.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Symposium, In Celebration of Charles Alan 
Wright, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (1998); see also Douglas Laycock, Charles Alan Wright and the 
University of Texas School of Law, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 367, 373 (1997) (“[The treatise is] the essential 
reference work on federal courts . . . . It is hard to overstate the importance of this work.”) 
2 For the uninitiated, Charles Alan Wright was the judicial law clerk to Charles Clark who, in 
turn, was the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules that drafted the original Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Wright was a “Colossus” of our profession. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 
1586. For symposia tributes chronicling the manifold contributions of Professor Charles Alan 
Wright, see, for example, id. at 1583 (noting that “Professor Wright’s career is crowded with signal 
achievements”); William H. Rehnquist, In Memoriam: A Tribute to Charles Alan Wright, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2000) (noting Professor Wright’s “prodigious legal writing,” as well as his career as “a 
skilled advocate” and his contributions to federal practice). Arthur Miller worked closely with 
Wright, joining him as a coauthor in 1969. Miller, who has taught civil procedure for nearly fifty 
years at several elite law schools, is not only a treasure of the academy, but also a celebrity. For 
tributes collected in symposia, see, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute to Arthur Miller, 67 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (2011); Mary Kay Kane, Foreword, 90 OR. L. REV. 913, 914 (2012) 
(mentioning Professor Miller’s achievements and his “awe-inspiring” career). 
3 Wright condemned, in particular, (1) the growing lack of uniformity in the Rules as a result 
of local rule proliferation and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, (2) the attack on the adversary 
system as a result of mandatory disclosure, and (3) the increasing complexity of the Rules. See 
Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 1-2, 7 (1994) 
(noting the “great disorder” in rulemaking, the challenges to the adversary system, and the fact 
that the original Rules were “most admired for their simplicity”). Wright noted: 
It is not a happy picture. When I survey the federal rulemaking scene, the words of 
Sir Edward Grey, looking out his Foreign Office window on August 3, 1914, come in-
evitably to mind: “The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit 
again in our lifetime.” I share that sense of gloom. 
Id. at 11. 
4 Miller has bluntly condemned (1) the dramatic transformation of the use of summary 
judgment, (2) the abandonment of notice pleading, (3) the constriction of discovery, (4) limitations 
on personal jurisdiction, (5) the expansion of mandatory arbitration, and (6) the limits on expert 
evidence. See Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2011) [hereinafter Miller, 
Doors Closing?] (describing procedural obstacles to including expert testimony); Arthur R. Miller, 
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE 
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We agree that something has fundamentally changed.5 In fact, we be-
lieve that we are in the midst of what should be labeled a new era—the 
fourth in the history of American civil procedure. The first three eras are 
rather conventional: the first era began with the country’s founding; the 
second era began in the middle of the nineteenth century with the introduc-
tion of code pleading; and the third era commenced in 1938 with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Part I, we defend the thesis that we are now in a distinct, fourth era. 
This era is not defined, for the most part, by the introduction of a new set 
of formal procedural rules; indeed, the formal procedural rules of the third 
era are largely intact. But if the core values of those rules have been eviscer-
ated by judicial decisions, interred by antipathy, and eulogized by none 
other than Wright and Miller, we should acknowledge that the third era has, 
in fact, yielded to a fourth. In Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, we untangle 
the many forces that conspired to produce this fourth era, offer an unflatter-
ing appraisal of it, and begin to plot a strategy for escaping its clutches. 
I. RECOGNIZING THE FOURTH ERA 
Periodization may be the most important thing historians do.6 The pro-
cess of understanding facts or data requires some organization;7 this is how 
 
L.J. 1, 17 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, A Double Play] (discussing changes to pleading standards); 
Arthur R. Miller, Keynote Address, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. 
REV. 465, 467 (2012) [hereinafter Miller, McIntyre in Context] (noting that “the summary 
judgment motion began to replace that possibility of trial”); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, 
Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 346 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Simplified Pleading] (criticizing “[t]he 
Supreme Court [for] mov[ing] the system from a notice pleading structure . . . to a fact pleading 
structure, which is exactly what the Federal Rules were drafted to reject”); Arthur R. Miller, The 
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding 
Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1044 (2003) [hereinafter 
Miller, The Pretrial Rush] (discussing changes in summary judgment after the 1986 trilogy). 
5 This is a popular position. Paul D. Carrington, the other living former reporter to the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules, has been just as forthcoming, frank, and critical as Arthur Miller. 
See generally Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REV. 637 
(2012); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 
DUKE L.J. 597 (2010); see also infra note 91 and accompanying text (noting that the system has 
shifted towards “constricting access to courts, limiting discovery, and denying trials”). 
6 See generally IGOR M. DIAKONOFF, THE PATHS OF HISTORY (1999); KARL JASPERS, 
THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY (1953). 
7 See Jason Scott Smith, The Strange History of the Decade: Modernity, Nostalgia, and the Perils of 
Periodization, 32 J. SOC. HIST. 263, 263 (1998) (“[P]eriodization has its own long history . . . .”). 
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humans think.8 The organization of historical facts and data into eras 
provides essential context for scholars, teachers, and students of a subject.9 
To be sure, one must be self-conscious about periodization, as it “is both the 
product and the begetter of theory.”10  
The history of American civil procedure divides rather naturally into 
three eras.11 The first era commenced with the founding of the United 
States. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, English substantive and 
procedural laws were transplanted.12 Ironically, the reception of English law 
continued even after the Revolution.13 As a practical matter, however, this 
was all the colonists knew.14 The inherited characteristics of procedure 
included the divergent yet complementary systems of law and equity.15 
Furthermore, because the new federal government introduced a layer of federal 
courts to complement the pre-existing layer of state courts, the law–equity 
dynamic endured on both of these levels.16 
In 1848, the State of New York launched the second era of American 
civil procedure history by enacting what has since been called the Field 
Code. The Code merged law and equity into a unified procedural system, 
deliberately tried to reduce the steps and procedural technicality of a 
 
8 See Marshall Brown, Periods and Resistances, 62 MODERN LANGUAGE Q. 309, 312 (2001) 
(“Without categories—such as periods—there can be no thought and no transcendence beyond 
mere fact toward understanding.”). 
9 See Dietrich Gerhard, Periodization in European History, 61 AM. HIST. REV. 900, 900 (1956) 
(referring to periodization as “the backbone of the organization of instruction”). 
10 William A. Green, Periodizing World History, 34 HIST. & THEORY 99, 99 (1995). 
11 By labeling the status quo as the fourth era we are implicitly concluding that none of the 
prior three eras should be subdivided into separate eras. We recognize that this is a debatable 
proposition. Civil procedure was different at the beginning and end of the founding era, and the 
experience of code pleading in the second era was neither uniform nor constant. Although these 
matters deserve more attention than the scope of this article allows, we are fairly confident that 
the variation within those earlier eras is more evolutionary than revolutionary.  
12 See generally ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 39 (1952); Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its 
Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951). 
13 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 928 (1987) (“After 1776 . . . English 
common law procedures continued in force.”). 
14 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 33-58 (2d ed. 1984) 
(discussing the state and development of American law during the colonial period); MILLAR, 
supra note 12, at 39 (noting the colonists’ “acceptance more or less complete of the English legal 
system and . . . English civil procedure”). 
15 See generally WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 
1956); FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW (1895).  
16 See generally MILLAR, supra note 12; Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1036-39 (1982); Subrin, supra note 13, at 927. 
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lawsuit, and articulated a distinct role for procedure, trying to ensure that 
substantive rights would be vindicated consistently, predictably, and correctly.17  
Around the turn of the twentieth century, reformers demanded a new 
procedure that would apply uniformly across all federal district courts.18 A 
well-chronicled, decades-long effort ultimately led to the passage of the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934.19 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became 
law four years later, launching the third era.  
The drafters of the Federal Rules wanted cases to be resolved on the 
merits. Yet it appears that the drafters had little faith in the ability of 
procedural rules to engineer that result. In the first and second eras, proce-
dure was so rigid and technical that it led to dismissals based upon techni-
calities and, more generally, enabled a “sporting theory of justice.”20 In the 
third era, the drafters cast procedure moreso as a villain or a necessary evil, 
rather than as a solution or a savior.21 The Federal Rules thus minimized 
judicial interference with the natural course of litigation as dictated by the 
attorneys. 
The Federal Rules were premised on the notion that, once the parties 
learned the relevant facts, cases would either settle or go to trial.22 Proce-
dure had a limited role in this process. It ensured that the parties had the 
mechanisms to obtain the relevant facts and, for those cases that did not 
settle, that the parties had access to a trial. According to those involved with 
the drafting and early interpretations of the Federal Rules, judges had the 
authority to dismiss the case prior to the discovery of relevant facts only in 
 
17 See Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an 
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 327 (1988) (“The major goal of the Code was 
to expedite the predictable enforcement of discretely articulated rights.”).  
18 See Subrin, supra note 13, at 943-44 (recounting the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
attempts to pass uniform federal rules at the turn of the century).  
19 See Burbank, supra note 16, at 1050-98 (noting the history behind the enactment of the Rules 
Enabling Act); Subrin, supra note 13, at 948-56 (describing the ABA Enabling Act Movement).  
20 In 1906, Roscoe Pound famously indicted the “sporting theory of justice,” “our exaggerated 
contentious procedure,” and “our [archaic] system of courts.” Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 739, 742 (1906). 
21 See, e.g., William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 57 (1948) 
(“A growing worship of formalism and technicality also began to obsess the courts of law.”); 
George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 30, 30 (1924) (“The Common Law 
made a feti[s]h of procedure.”). 
22 See Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE 
TRIAL, at iii (1932) (“[D]iscovery was expected to reduce the number of trials . . . . If both sides 
knew the full truth and each other’s strengths and weaknesses, they would settle the case and avoid 
the costs and uncertainties of trial.”); Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before 
Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 864 (1933) (“[F]rom the beginning until the end, the question of 
settlement is always involved in a litigated case.”). 
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exceptional circumstances.23 Furthermore, judges were given the authority 
to enter a summary judgment after the discovery of relevant facts and 
before a trial only in very limited circumstances.24 
While the precise rate of dismissals in those early decades under the new 
Federal Rules remains something of a mystery,25 we can fairly surmise that 
the number was very small. Even as late as the 1980s, the Advisory Com-
mittee reviewed and discussed a draft proposal to abrogate the 12(b)(6) 
motion because it was never used and, therefore, served no purpose.26 
 
23 See David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 983 (“No committee member identified case screening as a 
proper function for pleading.”). 
24 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: 
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 594-603 (2004) 
(“Summary judgment prior to the Federal Rules was in fact a collection of very different tools of 
very different (and usually very limited) scope . . . .”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: 
The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication 
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 138 (1988) (“[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted in cases in 
which the facts conflict, even when the movant appears to have the better of the argument.”); see 
also Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 423 
(1929) (explaining that summary judgment was designed as a tool for plaintiff creditors to obtain a 
judgment upon which they could collect without the delay of trial in cases where the liability of 
the debtor and the amount were uncontested). 
Of course, Judge Charles Clark and Judge Jerome Frank famously disagreed about the proper 
standard for summary judgment, with Judge Clark advocating for the more aggressive use. See 
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting the issue with 
“deny[ing] or postpone[ing] judgment where the ultimate legal result is clearly indicated”). Judge 
Frank thought that the “slightest doubt” about an issue of fact should defeat the motion. Id. at 
468. Clark worried that such a liberal standard would facilitate the use of litigation as a tool for 
plaintiffs to harass defendants and to extract extortionate settlements. See Charles E. Clark, The 
Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 579 (1952) (noting that such standard would “allow 
harassment of an equally deserving suitor . . . by a long and worthless trial”). But one should not 
overstate Clark’s enthusiasm for summary judgment; he envisioned a more active role for the 
motion only in cases where the material facts were not contested by either party. See id. at 567-69 
(1952) (explaining that summary judgment may be granted when “no defense is shown or when the 
defense appears to be sham or frivolous” and that summary judgment relies upon “uncontested 
facts”).  
25 Readers unfamiliar with the Administrative Office’s data might be surprised to learn that, 
although statistics regarding the number and timing of terminations were gathered, the nature of 
the terminations—for example, terminations by dismissal or by summary judgment—were not 
systematically measured. That methodology may, in fact, be as telling as it is frustrating: after all, 
judicial interference (by way of motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, for 
example) was simply not the focal point of the then-brand-new procedural schema. 
26 See THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN TWO FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURTS 1 (1989) (proposing the abrogation of Rule 12(b)(6)). See generally Lonny Hoffman, 
Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1500-01 (2013) 
(discussing the results of Willging’s study and the Advisory Committee’s response). 
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Around that time, Arthur Miller joked that the motion “was last effectively 
used during the McKinley administration.”27 
Summary judgment was the other dispositive motion that the new Fed-
eral Rules institutionalized yet also tempered. Once again, the activity of 
the rulemaking committee may provide the most useful insight about how 
the motion was (not) used in its early years. In the 1980s, reformers tried to 
amend the rule because judges were not using the summary judgment rule 
to its full effect.28 That was probably an accurate assessment since judges 
exhibited “extreme vigilance against treading on contested fact issues or 
mixed questions of law and fact—even arguable ones—reserving them for 
evidentiary hearings . . . . This was especially true in cases applying 
indeterminate legal standards, such as reasonableness.”29 Unless the parties 
settled, disputes regarding intent, state-of-mind, and credibility were 
virtually always tried, often before a jury.30  
Judges in the third era tried cases. In 1951, the federal courts tried 5085 
civil cases—12.5 percent of the total number of terminated cases.31 In 1962, 
the federal courts tried 6202 cases—11.4 percent of all terminated cases.32 
 
27 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER 
RESPONSIBILITY 8 (1984). Of course, we now know that, when Miller made this statement, an 
era of heightened pleading (enforced through 12(b)(6) dismissals, especially in civil rights cases) 
was newly underway. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
28 See Martin B. Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional 
Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 722 (1984) (noting that the summary judgment doctrine 
“has increasingly been ignored or paid mere lip service” by courts); Stuart R. Pollak, Liberalizing 
Summary Adjudication: A Proposal, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 419, 420 (1985) (criticizing the strongest 
standards used by appellate courts for reviewing summary judgment); William W. Schwarzer, 
Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 466 
(1984) (suggesting a new analysis by the court for summary judgment). See generally JOE S. CECIL & 
C.R. DOUGLAS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE IN THREE DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1987). 
29 Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 147 (2000). 
30 Id. at 149. The proposed amendment was abandoned as unnecessary once the summary 
judgment trilogy cases (and their predecessors) achieved the desired reform. See infra notes 66-70 
and accompanying text (discussing changes in the summary judgment doctrine).  
31 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 138 tbl.C-4, 140 tbl.C-5 (1951) 
[hereinafter 1951 ANNUAL REPORT]. There were 1892 jury trials, representing approximately 
thirty-seven percent of the total number of trials. Id. at 140 tbl.C-5.  
32 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 204 tbl.C-4 (1962) 
[hereinafter 1962 ANNUAL REPORT]. There were 2925 jury trials, representing approximately 
forty-seven percent of the total number of trials. Id. at tbl.C-5.   
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Throughout this timeframe, there were an average of twenty to twenty-four 
civil trials per year for each federal district judge.33 
Nearly all of the remaining cases were resolved by settlement. When the 
parties settled, it was because both parties agreed that the settlement was 
preferable to the alternative. Importantly, the alternative was a trial—
because motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment posed no 
meaningful threat to plaintiffs. Moreover, trial was a realistic alternative 
because the costs of taking cases to trial were not prohibitive to the parties; 
for example, the amount and costs of discovery were non-existent, modest, 
or (except for the extraordinary “mega cases”34) commensurate with the 
stakes of the litigation.35 Further still, courts tried cases at such a relatively 
swift pace that delay did not impose undue pressure to settle. For example, 
in 1951, the median time interval from filing to disposition for cases that 
were tried was 12.2 months.36 In 1962, the median for tried cases was 16 
months.37 Of course, for cases that were not tried, the time to disposition 
was much shorter.38 
 
33 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-4 (1951-1962). The number 
of authorized federal district court judgeships was 212 in 1951, and 301 in 1962. Authorized 
Judgeships, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAnd 
Judgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/all-judgeships.pdf.  
34 The term “mega case” is a loose descriptor for the unusually large and complex case. See 
David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 80-81 n.17 (1983) 
(using the term to describe cases “excluded as ‘too big’ to be handled within the scope of the 
research); see also infra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing discovery costs). 
35 In 1951, the use of discovery was very modest. A study of the use of discovery in five United 
States district courts revealed that formal discovery occurred in only 25.5% of all civil cases. 1951 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 31, at 105. Document requests were used in only four percent of all 
cases. Id. Depositions were used in fourteen percent of all cases. Id. Interestingly, this data was 
reported as showing that “the discovery rules are popular.” Id. at 104. Yet “[i]n appraising this one-
quarter use it should be remembered that much discovery is carried on without filing the papers 
and much information is furnished voluntarily under pressure of the rules.” Id. at 104-05; see also 
William H. Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1134-38 
(1951) (discussing contemporary views on the use of discovery through an analysis of its utilization 
in different types of cases). 
As there is very little mention of discovery abuse or even of discovery generally in the Annual 
Reports in the 1950s, 1960s, and even well into the 1970s, it appears fair to conclude that discovery 
was neither a serious problem nor perceived to be a serious problem in these decades. See generally 
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” a Little More: Considering the 1998 Proposals, 52 SMU 
L. REV. 229, 246-49 (1999) (citing data from studies conducted in 1960 by The Columbia Project 
for Effective Justice and in 1978 by the Federal Judicial Center). 
36 1951 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 31, at 140 tbl.C-5. 
37 1962 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 206 tbl.C-5. 
38 In 1963, fifty-three percent of all of the civil terminated cases were resolved without any 
court action. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 206 tbl.C-4 (1963). The 
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As is well documented elsewhere, the third era’s promise of a liberal 
pleading standard went unfulfilled.39 In the 1990s, Congress passed legisla-
tion requiring heightened pleading in litigation involving prisoners’ rights 
and securities.40 But more significant pleading reform occurred through 
judicial decisions rather than through rulemaking.41 The pleading standard 
first began to erode in the mid-1970s, when trial and appellate courts 
throughout the federal system imposed a heightened pleading standard for 
certain types of cases, most notably civil rights actions.42 In 1993,43 and then 
again in 2002,44 the Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts’ practice of 
imposing heightened pleading in civil rights cases, and found that only 
Congress or other rulemakers—not the courts—could deviate from the 
“notice pleading” standard required by Federal Rule 8(a).45 
Defense counsel pursued (and lower courts allowed) alternative mech-
anisms to impose heightened pleading, including requiring a more definite 
 
median time to disposition for these cases was five months. Id. at 209 tbl.C-5. Twenty-one percent 
of the cases involving court action were resolved before pretrial. Id. at 206 tbl.C-4. The median 
time to disposition for these cases was four months. Id. at 209 tbl.C-5; see also infra note 112 
(discussing concern for delays in judicial procedure). 
39 See infra note 51. 
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77-78 (2000)). See generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous 
Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 521-22 (1996) (discussing the tightening of pleading requirements as 
an effort to reduce frivolous litigation). 
41 See infra notes 42-51, 66-70 & 84-90 and accompanying text. 
42 See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in 
Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 939 (1990) (observing that “an increasing 
number of federal courts require that civil rights plaintiffs meet stricter or heightened standards of 
pleading in complaints”); David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 
CORNELL L. REV. 390, 391 (1980) (noting the shift to fact pleading in civil rights cases). See 
generally Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-
State Uniformity in Three States that have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. 
REV. 311, 331-32 (2001) (explaining that, during the 1970s and 1980s, “all federal courts of appeals applied 
a standard demanding factual specificity of civil rights plaintiffs filing cases in federal court”).  
43 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 
(1993). Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
44 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the 
opinion for a unanimous Court. 
45 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 (“[T]he Federal Rules do not contain a heightened 
pleading standard for employment discrimination suits. A requirement of greater specificity for 
particular claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, 
and not by judicial interpretation.’”); Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (“Perhaps if Rules 
8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected 
to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by 
the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”). 
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statement or demanding that plaintiff reply to the defendant’s answer.46 
The Supreme Court, like a drum major whose band was no longer follow-
ing, sprinted to get back in front of the parade and preserve the appearance 
of leadership. With its recent Twombly and Iqbal opinions, the Court 
“retire[d]” key language from the seminal notice pleading case of 1957,47 
instructed judges to ignore conclusory allegations,48 expanded the definition 
of conclusory allegations,49 and replaced notice pleading with a scheme labeled 
plausibility pleading.50 Plausibility pleading—together with its predecessor, 
heightened pleading—is nothing less than a “revolutionary” departure from 
notice pleading and from the original vision of the Federal Rules.51  
It is difficult to measure the practical effect of the shift in the Court’s 
pleading jurisprudence because there are many confounding factors.52 For 
example, the evolution of the pleading standard (1) increases the likelihood 
 
46 See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 618-19 (2002) 
(noting that lower courts found ways to circumvent Supreme Court precedent and require 
heightened pleading). The Supreme Court suggested these methods (and others) in Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1998). 
47 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 
45-46 (1957)). 
48 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679-81 (2009). 
49 Id. at 696-99 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 678 (majority opinion); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
51 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 823-24 (2010) (stating that Iqbal and Twombly “revolutionized” the law on 
pleading); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 527 
(2010) (noting that Twombly “started a revolution in pleading”); Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence 
and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1251, 1254 (2013) (labeling 
Twombly as “revolutionary”); see also Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 53, 54 (2010) (claiming that Iqbal and Twombly’s plausibility pleading was a “sea change”); 
Miller, A Double Play, supra note 4, at 331 (noting the changes caused by Iqbal and Twombly and 
arguing that the cases “turn their back on over sixty years of federal pleading jurisprudence”); 
Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 121 (2011) (“Iqbal and 
Twombly, by many accounts, two-stepped the Court from notice to heightened ‘plausibility’ 
pleading for all civil cases.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 466 
(2008) (arguing that plausibility pleading departs from the previous emphasis on justice in order 
to improve judicial efficiency); Stephen N. Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, 
the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 575 (2012) (criticizing the Iqbal majority’s 
reasoning and departure from the Federal Rules); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural 
Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 175 (2010) (explaining 
plausibility pleading as an attempt to address the mismatch between new substantive law and old 
procedural rules). 
52 See generally David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An 
Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); 
Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2285 (2012). 
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that defendants file motions to dismiss (thereby complicating comparison of 
grant rates between the third and fourth eras), (2) has some in terrorem 
effect that may motivate some plaintiffs to settle before a motion to dismiss 
is even filed (thereby complicating comparison of filing and grant rates), 
and (3) has some in terrorem effect that may discourage some plaintiffs 
from filing suit (thereby complicating comparison of filing and grant rates, 
while also affecting the composition of the civil caseload).53  
Many empirical studies have been conducted, and the results vary con-
siderably.54 One observation upon which experts agree is that certain types 
of cases are significantly affected by the evolution of the pleading standard.55 
But broader conclusions about the effects of Twombly and Iqbal are harder to 
draw because, inter alia, at least some lower courts were already applying 
stricter pleading standards at the time of the decisions.56 
Let us turn next to discovery, another hallmark of the third era.57 Dis-
missals at the pleading stage deny discovery that the third era would have 
allowed. The fact that the cases most likely to be dismissed are those 
characterized by asymmetrical information (where only the defendant 
knows many of the essential relevant facts) makes the denial of discovery 
especially potent since some of these cases are likely meritorious.58 
 
53 See generally Hoffman, supra note 52 (discussing these and other confounding factors); 
Gelbach, supra note 52 (same). 
54 See Engstrom, supra note 52, at 1231-32 (summarizing the empirical studies of Twombly and 
Iqbal). 
55 See id. at 1226 (summarizing the effects on job discrimination, civil rights, and other types 
of cases by Twiqbal). 
56 See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text. 
57 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 633 (1988) (noting the differences between the lack of discovery 
under the old common law and discovery under the Federal Rules); Richard L. Marcus, Slouching 
Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1613-14 (2003) (describing the revolution of 
discovery under the Federal Rules); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery 
Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 30 (1994) 
(explaining why discovery is especially necessary when lawyers do not want to turn over infor-
mation); see also supra note 22 (discussing the relationship between discovery and settlement). 
58 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 535 (2012) 
(recognizing that a lack of resources will likely prevent plaintiffs from bringing their claims); 
Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can 
Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1261-62 (2008) (noting that the 
information needed to make a claim is often in the possession of the defendant); Suzette M. 
Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental 
Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 87 (2010) (noting that the 
factual allegations needed in civil rights claims make them particularly vulnerable to dismissal); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
185, 195 n.59 (2010) (finding that plaintiffs without access to “smoking gun” documents and 
without the help of a whistleblower will be burdened by the “fact skepticism endorsed in Iqbal”). 
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Even for the cases that survive the pleading challenge, discovery has 
been curtailed. Since 1980, the Federal Rules have been amended numerous 
times: the scope of discovery was narrowed; numerical limits restricted the 
amount of discovery; and new discovery conferences, pre-trial conferences, 
mandatory disclosures, and sanction rules encouraged closer judicial super-
vision of discovery.59 
Contrary to the popular narrative, the problem with excessive discovery 
is—and has always been—more pervasive with respect to a particular slice 
of “mega cases,” approximately five to fifteen percent of the civil caseload.60 
In the majority of cases there is very little or no discovery and, in the other 
cases, the amount of discovery is, by any reasonable measure, proportionate 
to the stakes.61 Especially galling is the fact that many of the discovery 
reforms that impose additional costs (e.g., mandatory disclosure, conference 
obligations) permit opting out by stipulation; yet the “mega cases” are those 
where the parties may be most likely to opt out.62 Thus the cases where 
 
59 See generally Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a 
Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 1167, 1211-12 (2005) (summarizing changes introduced in the 1980s to limit certain forms of 
discovery); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 
ALA. L. REV. 529, 544 (2001) (“[B]y the mid-1970s and certainly by 1980, things had changed 
enough that the Rulemakers were beginning to cut back on the model of broad discovery that they 
had endorsed only a decade earlier.”). 
60 See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 5.2, at 288 & n.7 (5th ed. 2001) (citing authorities for the proposition that 
discovery abuse does not occur “in the great bulk of cases”); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. 
Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 791 (1998) (“Cases involving 
extensive discovery are in fact relatively rare—the studies using actual file reviews uncovered very 
few cases involving more than ten discovery requests, perhaps 5-15% depending on the sampling 
method. In the 1978 FJC study, less than 5% of the case files examined recorded more than ten 
discovery requests; of cases with at least some discovery, 90% had no more than ten requests.”); 
Thornburg, supra note 35, at 246-49 nn.107-25 (citing studies that indicate that discovery does not 
take place in more than fifty percent of cases).  
61 See Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. 
L. REV. 683, 684-86 (1998) (indicating that most studies find little to no discovery in the majority 
of cases); Thornburg, supra note 35, at 246-49 & nn.109, 113 & 123 (reporting the Federal Judicial 
Center’s finding that cases involve “little discovery, conducted at costs that are proportionate to 
the stakes of the litigation,” and reporting on empirical studies’ findings on the amount of 
discovery conducted in litigation). 
62 A number of rules authorize the parties to stipulate out of the discovery requirements on 
disclosure and authorize party agreements regarding the timing, amount, and scope of discovery. 
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 26(b), 29, 30(a), 33(a). In mega cases with massive amounts of 
discovery, the parties stipulate, or a judge orders, that numerical limits do not apply. Based upon 
conversations with our former students and other practitioners, we found that counsel often 
stipulate out of the mandatory initial disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Town of Gramercy v. Blue 
Water Shipping Services, Inc., 2009 WL 799738, at *2 (E.D. La. 2009) (stating that parties 
stipulated that initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 32(a)(1) would not be made). 
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discovery abuse is most likely are also least likely to be constrained by the 
new discovery rules. Meanwhile, cases in which there is little or no discov-
ery will suffer the additional transaction costs. Moreover, the scope of formal 
discovery, which establishes the parameters for both formal and non-formal 
exchanges of information,63 has been curtailed in all cases, even though in 
eighty-five to ninety-five percent of those cases formal discovery was either 
nonexistent or proportionate to the stakes.  
The massive expansion of filing and granting of summary judgment mo-
tions has also wreaked havoc on third-era ideals.64 For the drafters of the 
Federal Rules, summary judgment was an exceptional remedy with a very 
limited role.65 At some point between 1975 and 1986, judicial decisions 
transformed it into a focal point of litigation.66 This fundamental shift is 
enormously significant,67 arguably unconstitutional,68 probably inefficient,69 
and especially unfair to certain plaintiffs.70 
 
63 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
64 See Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’, and No Summary Judgment” 
Days of Employment Discrimination to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” 
Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 697 (2012) (noting an 
“increasing judicial preference for motions to dismiss and summary judgment”). 
65 See supra note 24. 
66 See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District 
Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 882, 890 (2007) (tracking the developments in 
summary judgment activity over time); see also Burbank, supra note 24, at 620 (noting that 
summary judgment “started to assume a greater role in the 1970s”); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-
Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1265 (2005) (noting an 
increase in the percentage of federal civil cases “terminating at various procedural stages”). 
67 See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 541-43, 547-
50 (2007) (discussing the inherent judicial biases against plaintiffs in motions for summary 
judgment and the constitutional issues ensuing from this bias); Miller, The Pretrial Rush, supra note 
4, at 1041-42 (noting the strategic significance of summary judgment motions). 
68 See Stempel, supra note 24, at 162-65 (noting possible Seventh Amendment issues with 
judges granting summary judgment motions); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is 
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 145-54 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is unconstitu-
tional under the Seventh Amendment and common law). 
69 Bronsteen, supra note 67, at 533 (“[I]n most cases, the cost of litigating to summary judg-
ment exceeds the cost of settling by a greater amount than the cost of trial exceeds the cost of 
litigating to summary judgment.”); Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts 
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 101-03 (1990) (explaining how summary judgment 
generally increases litigation costs); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: 
Judicial Humility, Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 680 (2012) 
(“It appears to be an inefficient anti-democratic exercise in result-oriented judicial activism.”); 
Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 231, 250 (2011) (suggesting a way to deal with summary judgment motions more efficiently). 
70 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 72 (1999) (discussing the use of summary judgment and the 
challenges it poses for plaintiffs in the context of Title VII harassment cases); Ann C. McGinley, 
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and 
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Once again, it is difficult to measure the practical effect of the shift in 
the Court’s jurisprudence. The transformation of the summary judgment 
motion also changes filing rates and has in terrorem effects that complicate 
any conclusions about causation.71 Even though a relatively small percentage 
of cases are terminated by summary judgments (approximately 7.7% in 
2000, an increase from 1.8% in 1960, according to one careful scholar’s 
conservative estimate72), what is most alarming is that considerably less than 
half of the cases that encounter a summary judgment motion will survive it.73 
Some district courts granted summary judgment motions in employment 
discrimination cases as much as ninety-five percent of the time.74 As with 
 
ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 208 (1993) (same). See generally Issacharoff, supra note 69, at 92 
(noting that, in 1988, summary judgment was never granted to plaintiffs in district courts); 
Stempel, supra note 24, at 159 (noting a shift in the relative power of the litigants). 
It is worth mentioning that, although the trilogy of summary judgment cases likely had a 
disproportionate effect on civil rights and discrimination cases, the alignment of justices in those 
cases defies simple ideological characterization. Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Brennan’s 
dissenting opinion in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329 (1986). Chief Justice Burger 
authored a dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268 
(1986). See also supra notes 43-44.  
Similarly, we have been unable to find any evidence that the early, aggressive use of motions 
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment by trial judges (prior to the Supreme Court 
decisions) is uniquely the product of Republican-appointed judges. As Professor Theodore 
Eisenberg brought to our attention, although ideology can often help explain judicial outcomes at 
the appellate level, empirical studies support the conclusion that there are little or no political 
effects in civil rights cases at the trial court level. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the 
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) 
(finding that the judges’ political preferences do not affect the outcome of summary judgment 
motions in civil rights cases); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements 
and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 840-41 (2010) (finding no effect of the 
judges’ political party on class action settlements and their fee awards); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., 
Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post 
Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 193 (2010) (finding that the “party of 
the deciding judge bears no relation to outcome”); see also Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of 
Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
213, 233 (2009) (suggesting that studies of political effects may be complicated by differences in 
judicial decisionmaking in published as opposed to unpublished opinions). Of course, the 
increasing politicization of all judicial appointments could change the outcome of such studies 
going forward. 
71 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
72 Burbank, supra note 24, at 617-18. 
73 See Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We Ought 
to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 710 (2012) (citing Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George 
Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael Baylson 1 (Apr. 12, 2007, rev. June 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf)  (stating that defendants 
win fifty-five to sixty-eight percent of their summary judgment motions).  
74 See id. at 710 n.35; see also BARRETT & FARAHANY, LLP, JUSTICE AT WORK, ANALYSIS 
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS FOR CASES IN WHICH AN ORDER WAS ISSUED 
ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 2011 AND 2012 IN THE U.S. 
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pleading and discovery, the transformation of summary judgment has been 
labeled a “revolutionary” departure from prior practice.75 
One virtue of the fourth era is that cases are resolved promptly. Since 
1990, the median time to disposition for all terminated civil cases is about 
seven or eight months.76 This efficiency is achieved because more cases are 
resolved earlier in the litigation process. With trial in the fourth era being a 
“pathological event,”77  the reduction in the number of cases surviving 
motion for summary judgment improves the overall time to disposition 
numbers. For the one percent of cases in 2012 that reached the trial stage, 
the median time to disposition was twenty-three months.78 
We emphasize the reforms to the pleading standard from 1976 forward, 
to the discovery rules from 1980 forward, and to summary judgment 
practice from 1975 forward—but, of course, these are not the only procedur-
al reforms. The other reforms largely illustrate more of the same—in fact, 
there has been “no major reform to the Federal Rules over the past forty 
years in which the idea of deciding cases ‘on the merits’ was the principal 
motivation behind the reform.”79 With more pages, we would emphasize, as 
others have documented, the attack on class actions (which is an affront to 
the drafters’ vision of liberal joinder),80 the transformation of Rule 11 (into a 
 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326697 (reporting grant rates of ninety-five 
percent for partial summary judgments and eighty-three percent for full summary judgments).  
75 See D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the 
Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 38 (1988) (discussing 
the “new” use of summary judgment); see also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: 
MARCH 31, 2012 tbl.C-5 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/201
2/tables/C05Mar12.pdf (seven months); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 157 tbl.C-5 (1990) (eight months). 
77 See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudica-
tion, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 261 n.200 (1995) (“[W]e are approaching a time when 
many a civil trial will be characterized as a ‘pathological event.’”). 
78 2012 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-5. There were 3147 trials in 2012. Of 
these, 2205 (or approximately seventy percent) were jury trials. Id. at tbl.C-4, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tab
les/C04Mar12.pdf; see also infra note 112 (discussing delays in civil cases). 
79 Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 418 n.47 (2010). 
80 See Paul D. Carrington, Protecting the Right of Citizens to Aggregate Small Claims Against 
Businesses, 46 MICH. J. L. REFORM 537, 538, 546 (2013) (noting the Court’s “subversion of Rule 
23(b)(3)” and “hostility to the aims stated in Rule 1”). See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) (discussing how companies can position themselves “beyond the 
reach of aggregate litigation”); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. 
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rule that chilled access to courts, also undermining the drafters’ vision),81 
the retrenchment on the recovery of attorneys’ fees by plaintiffs,82 and the 
installation of broad judicial case management, often designed and imple-
mented to dispose of cases without trial.83  
Other reforms that deserve to be mentioned as evidence of transition to a 
new, fourth era are not directly tied to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Summary judgments have been even easier to obtain because rules regarding 
the admissibility of evidence have been tightened.84 The enforcement of 
 
REV. 729, 731 (2013) (describing the decreasing willingness of courts to allow plaintiffs to bring 
class actions). 
Given our periodization, we must add an additional note on timing. The original class action 
rule spawned many interpretation problems, leading in 1966 to a substantial revision that 
essentially created a new, more expansive, and more useful rule. See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1752–1753, at 18-54 (3d ed. 2005) (recounting 
the history of this rule). But the backlash was swift—dating, once again, to the 1970s. See generally 
Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and “The Class Action 
Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 666-67 (1979) (describing growth of, and backlash against, class 
actions in federal court). 
81 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11-13 (1989) (discussing 
misconceptions about the purpose of the rule); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of 
American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1941 (1989) (discussing 
the further unpredictability of Rule 11); see also Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Federal 
Amended Rule 11—Some “Chilling” Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 
GEO. L.J. 1313, 1337-38 (1986) (noting the uncertainty of Rule 11 changes in terms of chilling 
certain actions). 
Given our periodization, we note that the transformation of Rule 11 occurred in 1983. Unlike 
the many fourth-era reforms introduced by judicial (re)interpretation, this is an example of a 
formal rule amendment. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on 
Rulemaking: The Rule 11 Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 564-66 (2004) (describing the 
creation of the rule as a response to corporate concerns). 
82 See generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil 
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1087, 1096 (2007) (“[A] second, more subtle erosion of fee-shifting provisions has come from the 
courts under the guise of promoting settlement . . . .”); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private 
Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 206 (2003) (criticizing “parsimonious fees decisions” 
in such cases). 
83 See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 
670 (2010) (recognizing that “[j]udging changed thirty years ago” with the introduction of active 
case management); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 45 (1995) (noting how managerial judges subvert 
inherent checks in the judicial system); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 
380 (1982) (discussing trial judges as “case managers”); Subrin, supra note 57, at 27-50 (discussing 
weaknesses in the system that are subverted); infra notes 117-127 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing judicial case management).  
84 One particular limitation—introduced in 1993 by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
509 U.S. 579 (1993)—is a “summary judgment substitute[].” JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: 
Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 719 
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arbitration clauses has also denied access to federal courts in an enormous 
number of cases;85 litigants redirected to arbitration may or may not receive 
access to facts and to the trial that the drafters of the Federal Rules en-
shrined.86  Personal jurisdiction doctrine has evolved in a manner that 
increasingly restricts easy access to courts.87 Justiciability and Eleventh 
Amendment doctrines have also conspired to deny access.88 The substantive 
law itself has been modified as well, sometimes under the guise of proce-
dure,89 to make liability harder to prove and remedies harder to obtain.90 
 
(2004); see also Schneider, supra note 51, at 551-52 (explaining how Daubert has changed the way 
federal courts deal with summary judgment). 
85 See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1027, 1040 (2012) (“[I]n the 1980s the Court began to revolutionize federal arbitration law.”). 
See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 233, 235 (2008) (noting a change in the judicial system because of the increase in arbitra-
tion); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is 
Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 188 (2003) (discussing the uncertainty in 
new mediation programs).  
86 See generally Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (indicating skepticism with alternative dispute resolution (ADR)); Harry 
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 669 (1986) 
(same); Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 391 (2005) (equating 
the ADR system with the concept of equity in the courts); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1649 (2005) (arguing that arbitration eliminates the 
rights of a consumer to appear in court before a judge). 
87 See generally Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision, in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 368-77 (2012) (criticizing 
Nicastro’s reasoning); Miller, McIntyre in Context, supra note 4, at 478 (criticizing the judiciary for 
“moving the specter of case termination forward in time, denying access to discovery, [and] 
limiting forum choice,” thus empowering defendants); David E. Seidelson, A Supreme Court 
Conclusion and Two Rationales that Defy Comprehension: Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior 
Court of California, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 563, 578-79 (1987) (discussing Asahi’s additional conduct 
rationale). 
88 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: October Term 2010, 14 
GREEN BAG 2D 375, 389 (2011) (noting a “distrust of the courts” underlying some Supreme Court 
decisions); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1114 (2006) (describing “the 
Court’s jurisprudence as ‘hostility’ to ‘litigation’”); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and 
the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 331 (2012) (discussing the split in the Supreme 
Court decisions limiting plaintiff access to the courts). 
89 See, e.g., Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2531, 2552 (2011) (refusing to allow certi-
fication in a suit where the commonality was part of the alleged discrimination); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 688 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court’s decision eliminates 
supervisory liability); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 768 (1989) (allowing petitioners not party to 
a consent decree to reopen the case); Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) 
(refusing to certify a class for lack of reasonable specificity). See generally Phyllis Tropper 
Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The 
Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 216 (1992) 
(“[S]ubstantive law largely affects behavior through procedure.”). 
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Rule systems and interpretations of rules invariably change and evolve. 
We call this a new era, however, because these reforms are profound, 
correlated, and enduring. These changes are profound because they have 
eviscerated the core values of the Federal Rules, namely simplicity, uni-
formity, access to courts, decisions on the merits, and attorney latitude. 
These changes are correlated and enduring because, since the 1970s, they 
have pointed largely in one direction: constricting access to courts, limiting 
discovery, and denying trials.91 
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH ERA 
Conspicuously absent from the history of the fourth era of procedure is 
the policy debate that should occur when lawmakers and the public are 
presented with a choice between the competing visions of the third and 
fourth eras. Procedure is power, of course, so the stakes of choosing one 
over the other produces different winners and losers.92 In a debate, the 
 
90 See generally Miller, Doors Closing?, supra note 4, at 593 (“[H]eightened class action certifi-
cation requirements have become a form of pre-trying the merits of the plaintiff ’s cause.”); Judith 
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 
224 (2003) (arguing recent holdings instruct judges only to grant remedies where they possess 
“express congressional permission”). 
91  See supra notes 88-89. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Chancellor’s Boot, 54 BROOK. 
L. REV. 31, 33-34 (1988) (“[I]t is the judges who have been closing the courthouse doors.”); 
Galanter, supra note 66, at 1265 (documenting the shift away from trials); Marc Galanter, The Turn 
Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002) (describing a 
general search for alternatives to law); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: 
Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 
1760 (2014) (discussing how the Roberts and Rehnquist courts pushed against certifying class 
actions with “traditional” reasoning that plaintiffs deserve their “day in court”); Judith Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 541 (1985) (noting a 
“decline in the valuation of procedure”); Schneider, supra note 51, at 527 (explaining how judges 
used pleading burdens to disfavor plaintiffs in civil rights cases); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New 
Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation 
Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 701, 717-20 (1993) (describing a shift from an “open” to “restrictive” 
courts paradigm); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at 
Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
297, 312-17 (1996) [hereinafter Stempel, Multi-Door Courthouse] (describing Justice Warren Burger’s 
role in the shift to alternative dispute resolution); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989) (discussing changes in the Rules 
from the 1970s onward); Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghosts of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3, 23-30 (1988) (noting the Rules 
may have become “stingier”); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil 
Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 636 (“Instead of trials, judges are making rulings on other 
dispositive motions . . . .”).  
92 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1711 (2004) (“The messages that Congress was likely to derive from this 
evidence of the changing role of the federal courts . . . [included] the power of procedure in aid 
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trade-offs between the two visions would be explored, the empirical data 
gathered, and the interested constituencies consulted. Yet that debate never 
happened. Indeed, it is all-too-fitting that the third era itself was denied 
notice and the right to be heard before it was interred by judges.  
The absence of such a debate also makes a history of the fourth era more 
difficult to write: there was no specific moment when it was passed, no 
legislative history revealing its purpose, and no anointed leaders personify-
ing it.93 Another barrier to a complete understanding of the historical 
origins of the fourth era is the fact that we are still in it. Because we have 
advocated against many of its reforms, we surely lack the objectivity and 
distance that tend to improve historical accounts. Nevertheless, much work 
has already been done by many careful scholars, including judges,94 who 
 
of that enhanced role.”); see also Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 818-22 (2010) (opining that procedure is an instrument of power and 
social control that can favor certain groups over others). 
93 By contrast, the second and third eras were subject to transparent democratic processes 
that yielded speeches, reports, and records. For the legislative background of the Field Code as 
part of a statutory codification movement, see Subrin, supra note 17, at 316-17, 337. For the 
legislative background of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Burbank, supra note 16, 
at 1050-98, and Subrin, supra note 13 at 910, 969-70.  
It is likely that many different individuals are responsible for the transition from the third to 
the fourth era but, because most of them are still alive, we lack relevant archives. It is quite likely 
that Warren Burger, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1969 to 1985, is the single most 
responsible person for this transition; he died in 1995, but his papers are closed to researchers until 
2026. SWEM LIBRARY, WARREN BURGER COLLECTION, https://swem.wm.edu/research/ 
special-collections/warren-burger-collection (last visited May 13, 2014). 
94 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 64, at 704 (examining the effect of a change in focus to sum-
mary judgment motions); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Mahon Lecture, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
501, 502 (2006) (“[T]he work of the United States District Court, the trial court, has changed.”); 
D. Brock Hornby, Stepping Down, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 265, 266 (2006) (“[F]ederal 
trials—particularly civil trials—have become a luxury . . . .”); William G. Young, A Lament for 
What Was Once and Yet Can Be, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 305, 309, 312 (2009) (examining 
the decay of the American jury system, as well as the changes in discovery); William G. Young, 
Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 83 (2006) 
[hereinafter Young, Vanishing Trials] (advocating a return to trials); see also Scott Brister, The 
Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 207-12 (2005) (surveying 
the costs in the decline of trials); Jennifer Walker Elrod, Is the Jury Still Out?: A Case for the 
Continued Viability of the American Jury, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 303, 308 (2012) (defending the 
role of the jury); James E. Gritzner, In Defense of the Jury Trial: ADR Has Its Place, But it is Not the 
Only Place, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 349, 364 (2012) (criticizing ADR as a system where “no one wins 
everything”); Nathan L. Hecht, The Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: Trends in Texas Courts and an 
Uncertain Future, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 182 (2005) (advocating for “better advertising” of the 
jury trial); David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas: State and Federal 
Practice, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1379, 1383-85 (2010) (analyzing summary judgment); Stanley Marcus, 
Wither the Jury Trial, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 27, 33 (2008) (lamenting a decline in “public 
support for the rule of law”); Terry R. Means, What’s So Great About a Trial Anyway? A Reply to 
Judge Higginbotham’s Eldon B. Mahon Lecture of October 27, 2004, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 513, 
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have identified the narrative threads that we weave together here as a first 
draft of the history of the fourth era. 
We also draw upon our experience as litigators (née trial lawyers) in the 
third and fourth eras, respectively. The older of us prepared and tried cases 
in the critical years between 1963 and 1970,95 and saw the increases in lawyer 
time and client expense occurring when Massachusetts adopted oral deposi-
tions by court rule in 1966, thereby making discovery a lucrative industry.96 
The younger of us clerked for a federal appeals judge, litigated for a few 
years in the late 1990s with a prestigious Boston law firm, and then managed 
litigation as an in-house corporate counsel.97 Only one of us remembers a 
time when litigation routinely began with ex parte orders freezing the 
defendant’s assets and often ended with trials, and only one of us experi-
enced Rule 16 conferences, discovery conferences, and mandatory mediation 
as routine components of litigation, with arbitration as the only realistic 
possibility for “trial” experience. 
Our disparate practice experiences and overlapping research agendas 
have convinced us of three things. First, just as prior to the third era all 
signs pointed to liberal equity procedure for the new Federal Rules,98 as one 
looks back to the 1970s, most paths instead lead to a more constrictive 
procedure and a reduction of live, oral participation in the civil litigation 
process.99 Second, the very liberality of the original Federal Rules, accom-
panied by rights-granting federal legislation and the civil and consumer 
 
520-21 (2006) (responding to Judge Higginbotham’s concerns); Craig Smith & Eric V. Moye, 
Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment 
Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 295-98 (2012) (criticizing the rise of private legal 
solutions). 
95 Subrin practiced law, first as an associate and then as a partner, at Burns & Levinson.  
96 See Robert G. Bone, Procedural Reform in a Local Context: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court and the Federal Rule Model (explaining the causes and effects of adopting the Rules), in THE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 1692–1992 393 
(Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: 
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2032-33 (1989) 
(“[I]n 1966, after a lengthy lobbying effort by Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro of the Massachusetts 
Superior Court . . . the Supreme Judicial Court promulgated a rule for oral depositions and 
other types of discovery . . . .”). 
97 Main clerked for Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, practiced with the law firm of Hill & Barlow, and then served as associate general counsel 
for the privately-held company Platinum Equity, LLC. 
98 See Subrin, supra note 13, at 957 (“Virtually every intellectual, cultural, and political sign-
post pointed to equity.”). 
99 One exception to this is the periodic growth of the use of class actions. See STEPHEN N. 
SUBRIN & MARGARET WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 
205-06 (2006) (detailing the “roller-coaster” history of the device). For current attempts to curtail 
the growth of class actions, see generally Tidmarsh, supra note 79, at 418-28. 
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rights movements, provides one cluster of causal links to the intense 
backlash of constriction.100 Third, although conservative ideology and actors 
played a significant role in bringing the fourth era to fruition, conservatives 
did not act alone.101 In the sections that follow, we identify the protean, 
multidimensional, and overlapping forces that powered the transition from 
the third era to the fourth. 
A. Growth in Civil Caseloads 
In the 1970s, the federal judiciary witnessed massive growth on a num-
ber of fronts. First and foremost, the civil caseload exploded. Between 1962 
and 1975, the number of civil filings doubled, yet the number of federal 
district judges increased only by a factor of 1.2.102 Between 1975 and 1983, 
the number of civil filings doubled again, and the number of federal district 
judges increased only by a factor of 1.3.103 
This increase in the number of filings was fueled in part by plaintiffs 
seeking vindication under statutory rights that had not previously existed.104 
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, Congress created hundreds of jurisdic-
tional grants.105 Vindicating the substantive mandate of these new statutory 
rights would have been difficult without the liberal Federal Rule regime to 
complement their enforcement.106 
 
100 See supra notes 20-24; infra notes 113-154 and accompanying text.  
101 See supra note 70; infra notes 142-148 & 159 and accompanying text.  
102 1962 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 198 tbl.C-3; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
349, tbl.C-3 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
103 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 548 tbl.A-12. 
The number of civil filings has largely stabilized in the thirty years since. The number of new 
filings in 2012 is only eighteen percent higher than the number of new filings in 1983. See 2012 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx? 
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/C03Mar12.pdf.  
104 For a discussion in real time of courts’ reaction to this phenomenon, see 1975 ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 102, at 211-25. The surge after 1975 cannot be explained solely by population 
growth or by increases in the gross domestic product. See Galanter, supra note 103, at 549 tbl.A-13 
(listing civil filings along with the U.S. population for a period of forty years). 
105 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 956 (2000) (providing this figure and citing Memorandum from the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Revision of List of Statutes Enlarging Federal Court 
Workload (Sept. 18, 1998) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)). 
106 See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54-55 (1997) (discuss-
ing how the shift from bureaucratic to civil litigation since the 1950s was partly made possible by 
liberalized discovery rules); Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997) 
(“Over the years access to the powerful federal engine of discovery has become central to a wide 
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The increase in the number of filings was also fueled in part by an in-
crease in the number of lawyers. The number of lawyers nearly doubled 
between 1970 and 1984—a growth rate three times faster than that of other 
professions and four times faster than the general population during the 
same period.107 The size of large law firms and their fees similarly escalat-
ed.108 Much of the growth was in litigation departments, as the appetite for 
discovery in big cases proved insatiable.109 Meanwhile, an entrepreneurial 
plaintiffs’ bar developed techniques to manage large-scale, expensive 
litigation.110 Moreover, technology was transforming litigation generally, 
and discovery in particular.111 There was also widespread concern among 
judges and lawyers that civil cases could not be processed without inordi-
nate delay.112 Even the casual observer of the American legal scene, let alone 
 
array of social policies.”); see also Coleman, supra note 58, at 528 (arguing that private civil 
litigation forces organizations to conform to laws and social mores). 
107 RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 75-77, 280-81 (1989). 
108  See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 24, 46, 87-88 (1991) (discussing the tremendous 
expansion and lucrative profits realized by large law firms during the period); George P. Baker & 
Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1658-59 (2006) (demonstrating that another period of growth in the number of 
lawyers and large law firms occurred between 1998 and 2004). 
109 See Galanter, supra note 108, at 51 (noting the growth of litigation departments in big 
firms).  
110 See Roger S. Fine & Theodore M. Grossman, Mass Torts (“The organized plaintiffs’ bar 
has been candid about both their coordination and their intent to focus aggregate liability tactics 
on various industries.” (internal citations omitted)), in SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN 
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL §73:4 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669, 676 (1986) (identifying plaintiffs’ attorneys as 
“profit-motivated” and “risk-taking” entrepreneurs).  
111 See Alan Blakley, Differences and Similarities in Civil Discovery of Electronic and Paper Infor-
mation, FED. LAWYER, July 2002, at 32, 32 (“Photocopying machines changed civil discovery as 
drastically as the Industrial Revolution changed manufacturing.”). 
112 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Preface to THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 5-6 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter 
POUND CONFERENCE] (articulating these concerns about the prospect of excessive delays in 
civil litigation); Edward H. Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective, 
Address at National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice (Apr. 9, 1976), in POUND CONFERENCE, supra at 269-70 (same); Leonard S. Janofsky, 
ABA Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A. J. 1323, 1323 (1979) (describing the 
initiatives of the ABA’s Action Program to Reduce Court Costs and Delays); Miller, McIntyre in 
Context, supra note 4, at 477 (recounting the cost and delay rhetoric from the late 1970s and early 
1980s when he served as Reporter to the Advisory Committee). 
Notwithstanding the popular narrative of court delays, the time to disposition remained fairly 
constant throughout the transition from the third to fourth eras. The median time to disposition 
for all terminated cases was eight months, ten months, nine months, nine months, and nine 
months, respectively, in 1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, and 1979. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
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judges, felt that the rapidly rising flood waters of more cases, new causes of 
action, the surfeit of lawyers, big law firms, and increasing fees demanded 
action, or at least serious attention. 
B. Case Management as a Solution 
The judges’ reaction to the perception that things were “out of control” 
was to “take control.” Even as early as the 1950s, judges realized that 
procedural rules that gave attorneys wide latitude could lead to expansive, 
expensive, and protracted litigation in mega cases.113 In 1951, after a series of 
meetings of federal judges concerned about the handling of protracted cases, 
the Judicial Conference of the United States on Procedure in Anti-Trust 
and Other Protracted Cases issued their report.  
This excerpt reveals the early history of what would later be labeled 
“case management”: 
It is not practical to proceed in these cases as in a lawsuit of ordinary com-
plexity and bulk; that is, to let the parties exhaust the cross fire of pleading, 
to conduct open-court pre-trial hearings, or to let counsel try the case as 
they please. The potential range of issues, evidence and argument is so 
great, and the necessities of adversary representation so compelling, that the 
activities of counsel will result in records of fantastic size and complexity 
unless the trial judge exercises rigid control from the time the complaint is 
filed.114 
Warren Burger, who later became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, was an early advocate of case management. In 1958, just two years 
after his appointment by President Eisenhower to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, Burger spoke publicly about the need for better “management 
 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS tbl.C-5 (1963–1979). The median time to disposition for cases that were tried 
was sixteen months, eighteen months, sixteen months, sixteen months, and nineteen months, 
respectively, in 1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, and 1979. Id. 
113 See Wayne O. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for 
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1313-14 (1978) (explaining that many attorneys viewed the use of 
obstructionist tactics during discovery as a means to secure the best results for their clients as well 
as their own bottom lines); see also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1041 (1975) (detailing what the author calls “adversary excess” and offering 
solutions that bring truth-finding more into focus). 
114 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE REPORT: PROCEDURE IN 
ANTI-TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES (1951), reprinted in Leon R. Yankwich, “Short 
Cuts” in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62, 65-66 (1951). 
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machinery.”115 He would later urge that, if hospitals and corporations could 
take advantage of business management techniques, so could the court 
system.116  
While case management became the norm for mega cases during the 
1970s, it has increasingly become the prescription for all cases.117 The federal 
judiciary taught effective case management to new federal judges who were 
brought “to the Federal Judicial Center in Washington for an intensive 
indoctrination with experienced Federal judges as their mentors.”118 As one 
judge-instructor explained, the purpose of case management was to promote 
settlement: 
[M]y goal is to settle all my cases. I don’t subscribe to the theory at all that 
we should take hold of a case at its inception and labor mightily to bring it 
to trial only . . . . Most of the time when I try a case I consider that I have 
somehow failed . . . . [T]he judge must not only explore settlement but 
must actively pursue it with all the vigor at his command . . . . [U]ntil 
every last road to settlement has been traveled, I will not try the case.119 
The emphasis on case management and settlement was part of a larger 
movement to hold businesses and government entities accountable by 
requiring the collection of data.120 The judiciary switched from a master-
calendar system to an individual-calendar system to hold each judge 
 
115 Warren E. Burger, The Courts on Trial, Speech at the American Bar Association (Feb. 21, 
1956), in WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 4, 6 (1990). 
116 Warren E. Burger, Deferred Maintenance of Judicial Machinery, Speech at the National 
Conference on the Judiciary (Mar. 12, 1971), in BURGER, supra note 115, at 56 (“I do not suggest 
that justice can ever become automated . . .[,] yet [in] the medical profession . . . [it is] possible 
today for one physician or surgeon . . . to do three to ten or fifteen times what his counterpart 
could do.”).  
117 Our reference to the 1970s is an occasion to note that the legal system never operates in a 
vacuum. We wonder whether the judicial urge to control and manage things might also be, in part, 
a reaction to the turbulent events of the preceding decade, which had experienced the assassina-
tions of President Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. The 
1960s and 1970s also contained the protest movements against the Vietnam War and racism, 
accompanied by long hair, communes, drugs, and promiscuity, and in some instances, violence and 
crime. All of these factors may well have instinctively enforced a sense that matters were out of 
control. As Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., wrote, history has its cycles. See generally ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1999). 
118 Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the Economics Club of New York (Jan. 23, 1974), in 
BURGER, supra note 115, at 98. 
119 Fred J. Cassibry, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY 
APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 271 (1971). 
120 See, e.g., William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete 
Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55, 60-62 (2013) (describing the 
incorporation of data-driven productivity analysis from private sector manufacturing, into the 
private service sector, and finally into government services like courts). 
  
2014] Fourth Era of Civil Procedure 1863 
 
accountable for the pace at which their dockets were cleared. 121  Data 
collection focused on details that could be counted, such as the length of 
time from case commencement to termination and the number of terminat-
ed cases each year, by each judge, and each federal district court.122 Not 
surprisingly, judges turned their attention to the variables by which they 
were being evaluated.123 
There was also much faith in alternatives to litigation. Preaching to a 
choir of members of the American Arbitration Association, for example, 
then-Judge Burger gave this skeptical view of the value of formal litigation: 
“One thing an appellate judge learns very quickly is that a large part of all 
the litigation in the courts is an exercise in futility and frustration. Most civil 
disputes which are in the courts could be disposed of more satisfactorily in 
some other way.”124 He similarly complained about the excessive use of 
discovery and the unethical behavior of some lawyers, especially in pretrial 
practice.125 He opined about the “flood” of cases reaching federal courts,126 
our “mass neurosis” in thinking that “courts were created to solve all the 
problems of mankind,”127 and stated that “[w]e live up to the statement that 
we are the most litigious people on the globe.”128 In a 1970 speech, shortly 
after becoming Chief Justice, Burger suggested that the state could save 
 
121 Resnik, supra note 91, at 522-23 n.127 (citing MAUREEN SOLOMON, CASEFLOW MANAGE-
MENT IN THE TRIAL COURT 9 (1973)) (suggesting that the calendar system creates a competitive 
atmosphere that motivates active case management); cf. Chief Judge Motley Describes Court, Career; 
Reflects on National Impact of Landmark Cases, THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1985, at 6 (“[T]he 
single-judge calendar system is the greatest invention since the wheel . . . . [H]aving an 
individual calendar system is the incentive for everybody to keep working so that he is not the last 
man on the totem pole.”). 
122 Young & Singer, supra note 120, at 62-65. 
123 See id. at 77 n.113 (suggesting that “[w]hat gets measured gets done”).  
124 Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the American Arbitration Association (Nov. 26, 1968), in 
BURGER, supra note 115, at 27. 
125 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the American Law Institute (May 15, 1984), in 
BURGER, supra note 115, at 142-43 (discussing discovery abuse); Warren E. Burger, The Special 
Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of 
Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 235 (1973) (“Another aspect of inadequate advocacy . . . is 
the failure of lawyers to observe the rules of professional manners and professional eti-
quette . . . .”); Martin Arnold, Burger to Press Judicial Reform: Pledges to Make Off-Bench Effort in 
Drive to Improve Administration of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1969, at 1 (“[T]he legal profession 
must condemn—and I repeat that—must condemn as unprofessional conduct every tactic . . . in 
which delay is used as a . . . weapon . . . .”). 
126 Warren E. Burger, Remarks at the American Newspaper Publishers Association Conven-
tion (May 7, 1985), in BURGER, supra note 115, at 148, 151. 
127 Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the American Arbitration Association (Nov. 25, 1968), in 
BURGER, supra note 115, at 27, 29. 
128 Warren E. Burger, Remarks at the Arthur T. Vanderbilt Dinner (Nov. 18, 1982), in 
BURGER, supra note 115, at 121, 123. 
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money by reducing the number of jurors from twelve to six, calling the 
Constitutional right to jury trial “a dubious provision.”129  
In 1976, Chief Justice Burger presided over The Pound Conference: Per-
spectives on Justice in the Future, a conference planned at his request.130 The 
conference assembled many of the detractors to the third era. For example, 
former Federal District Court Judge Simon H. Rifkind, at the time a named 
partner in the renowned firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garri-
son, suggested that discovery may be a luxury that an overtaxed judicial 
system could not afford.131 Robert Bork, then Solicitor General of the 
United States, gave an address entitled Dealing With the Overload in Article 
III Courts. He saw the problem as stemming from the fact that:  
[w]e, along with every other western nation, are steadily transforming our-
selves into a highly-regulated welfare state . . . . The proliferation of so-
cial policies through statute and regulation creates a workload that is even 
now changing the very nature of courts, threatening to convert them from 
deliberative institutions to processing institutions, from a judicial model to 
a bureaucratic model.132 
Probably the most forthright attack at the Pound Conference on the 
third era was given by Francis R. Kirkham, then chair of the Antitrust 
Section of the American Bar Association.133 He stridently complained about 
notice pleading,134 juries,135 class actions,136 abusive discovery,137 and forced 
settlement of meritless claims due to the high cost of litigating.138 He 
suggested requiring a recitation of facts showing “a discrete violation which 
has inflicted a discrete injury” at the complaint stage.139  
 
129 Warren E. Burger, Agenda for Change, Remarks before the Philadelphia Bar Association 
(Nov. 14, 1970), in BURGER, supra note 115, at 46, 49. Burger achieved this reform. See Colgrove v. 
Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973) (holding that a six-person jury satisfies the Seventh Amendment). 
130 See Warren E. Burger, Preface to POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 5. 
131 Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, Address at the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 8, 
1976), in POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 51-52, 61-62. 
132 Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, Address at the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 8, 
1976), in POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 150-51. 
133 Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation—Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 
Address at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice (Apr. 8, 1976), in POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 209. 
134 Id. at 211-12. 
135 Id. at 212-13. 
136 Id. at 214-17. 
137 Id. at 217. 
138 Id. at 216-217. 
139 Id. at 219. 
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It was also at the Pound Conference that Frank Sander famously intro-
duced the idea of the “multi-door courthouse,” where litigants would have a 
choice of (or perhaps be redirected to) other types of dispute resolution, 
such as mediation and arbitration.140 The movement for alternative dispute 
resolution had, from its inception, proponents from the left as well as the 
right.141 The left saw potential in community justice centers as a forum for 
claims that were too expensive or too local for formal adjudication.142 By 
contrast, the right saw the potential in binding arbitration agreements to 
redirect a large swath of cases away from the courts.143 
There were also some dissenting voices (or, one might say, some defend-
ers of certain components of the third era) at the Pound Conference. 
Federal District Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., quoted Roscoe Pound, 
noting that “in discouraging litigation we encourage wrongdoing.”144 Judge 
Slade Gorton, Attorney General of the State of Washington, similarly 
pointed out that procedural suggestions of the main speakers were in fact 
substantive and would “severely limit court enforcement of widely accepted 
norms of economic conduct against major business enterprises.”145 Laura 
Nader, a renowned professor of sociology, bemoaned the “lack of data 
 
140 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the National Conference 
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 8, 1976), in 
POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 65, 83-84. 
141 See SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 99, at 216-17 (discussing the different players in the ADR 
movement, including the community judgment movement); Main, supra note 86, at 336-37 (“The 
ADR movement found traction because it intertwined threads of the political left and 
right . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
142 See generally FORD FOUNDATION, CURRENT INTERESTS OF THE FORD FOUNDA-
TION: 1978 AND 1979, at 6-7 (“The [Ford] Foundation plans to support investigations of new 
ways of settling disputes that may be more equitable, cheaper, and less divisive than the adversary 
process.”); Ralph Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, 11 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 247, 255 (1976); William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 384-87 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, 
ATLANTIC, July 1979, at 25, 29-30. 
143 SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 99, at 217-18; see also Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1669, 1670 (1985) (stating that “Chief Justice Burger [was] not moved by love, or by a desire to 
find new ways to restore or preserve loving relationships, but rather by concerns of efficiency and 
politics. He seeks alternatives to litigation in order to reduce the caseload of the judiciary or, even 
more plausibly, to insulate the status quo from reform by the judiciary”); Stempel, Multi-Door 
Courthouse, supra note 91, at 344 (“ADR’s biggest boosters are commercial organizations, employers, 
insurers, political conservatives, and Republicans.”). 
144 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, Address at 
the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice (Apr. 8, 1976), in POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 87, 88. 
145 Wade H. McCree, Jr. et al., Commentary, Speeches at the National Conference on the 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 8, 1976), in POUND 
CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 220, 225-26. 
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undergirding statements by several people here” and the lack of attention to 
issues of power, empathy, and the less fortunate.146 
So far as we can tell, the increased utilization of case management, ac-
companied by emphasis on efficiency, did not have pure political underpin-
nings in its origins or growth. Although Chief Justice Burger was the most 
vocal proponent, other case management hawks (quoted above) included 
Judge Cassibry, who was appointed to the bench by President Johnson, and 
Simon Rifkind, who was a New Deal enthusiast that served in the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations.147 Joe Biden, a Democrat first elected to the 
U.S. Senate in 1972 (and presently the Vice President), spearheaded the 
drive to force federal district courts to experiment with ways to make civil 
litigation more efficient.148 Meanwhile, the case management doves quoted 
above included the famously liberal Judge Leon Higginbotham, but also 
Slade Gorton, who would later represent Washington State in the U.S. 
Senate as a member of the Republican party. 
After the Pound Conference, the drive toward case management contin-
ued, largely unabated. In 1980, Federal Rule 26 was amended to require an 
early discovery conference in all but a handful of excluded cases.149 In 1983, 
Rule 16 was amended to explicitly include settlement and alternative dispute 
resolution as topics for discussion at pretrial conferences.150 In the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990,151 Congress ordered all ninety-four federal 
district courts to promulgate measures to expedite the resolution of cases on 
their dockets; this, in turn, promoted case management and alternative 
dispute resolution.152 In 1993, Rules 16 and 26 were amended yet again to 
 
146 Erin Griswold et al., Commentary, Speeches at the National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 8, 1976), in POUND CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 112, at 110, 114-19; see also id. at 119 (concluding her speech by quoting Hon. Leon 
Higginbotham’s remark that “[w]hile there is an essential place for non-judicial forums in 
resolving disputes, the cutting edge of the move to remedy the results of dehumanization must 
have a sharp judicial component”). 
147 See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, RABBIS AND LAWYERS: THE JOURNEY FROM 
TORAH TO CONSTITUTION 165 (1990) (highlighting the prominence of Jewish lawyers, 
including Simon Rifkind, in New Deal circles). 
148 See Tom Melling, Dispute Resolution Within Legislative Institutions, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1677, 
1708 (1994) (citing 136 CONG. REC. S415 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden)) 
(describing Senator Biden’s establishment of a “task force” in order to develop judicial reform). 
149 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s notes to the 1980 amendments. 
150 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee’s notes to the 1983 amendments. 
151 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (2012)).  
152 The Civil Justice Reform Act sought “to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on 
the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management and ensure just, speedy and 
inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes.” 28 U.S.C. § 471-82. See generally A. Leo Levin, Beyond 
Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN’S 
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expand the judges’ case-management authority. 153  By the mid-1990s, 
“individualized case management [had taken] hold as a central feature of the 
federal civil pretrial process.”154 
C. Business and Political Responses 
Beginning in the 1950s, and intensifying over the next thirty years, the 
business community, especially the insurance industry, responded with fury to 
the allegedly pro-plaintiff aspects of civil litigation.155 Insurance companies 
spent $10 million in advertisements in Time, Newsweek, Sports Illustrated, and 
other publications attacking greedy plaintiffs and runaway juries.156 The 
advertising campaign continued in the mid-1980s, with ads proclaiming 
“The Lawsuit Crisis is Bad for Babies” and “The Lawsuit Crisis is Penaliz-
ing High School Students.” 157  The mass media likewise contemplated, 
“[w]hy [e]verybody is [s]uing [e]verybody.”158  
 
This narrative, in turn, was integrated into the 1988 presidential campaign:  
Almost all the grievances that conservatives would advance against civil 
justice delivery in the United States found expression during the Bush-
Quayle administration, culminating in a report from the President’s Council 
 
L. REV. 877, 878 (1993) (arguing that the law’s framers believed specific goals would be key to its 
success). 
153 See supra notes 149-150; see also Gensler, supra note 83, at 679 (”Even Rule 1 was amended 
to embrace the emerging case-management ethos.”). 
154 Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 KAN. L. REV. 849, 854 (2013). 
155 See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is Between Peo-
ple’s Ears:” Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 466-72 
(2000) (discussing marketing campaigns highlighting excessive damage awards); Marc Galanter, 
An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 725-
33 (1998) (pointing to both “global characterizations” and “atrocity stories” as mechanisms through 
which proponents of tort reform mischaracterize the civil justice system); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded 
Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (discussing ways in which the myth of discovery abuse 
has spread in American society); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 
77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 406-07 (1992) (suggesting corporate and insurance interests enjoyed too 
much influence in shaping the Civil Justice Reform Act). 
156 Daniels & Martin, supra note 155, at 461 (quoting Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising 
and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1979)). 
157 Id. at 467. 
158 David F. Pike, Why Everybody is Suing Everybody, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 
1978, at 50; see also Marc Galanter, The Conniving Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal 
Remedies, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 660 (2000) (quoting a Washington Post article noticing that, 
“[a]cross the country, people are suing one another with abandon; courts are clogged with 
litigation; lawyers are burdening the populace with legal bills . . . . This massive, mushrooming 
litigation has caused horrendous ruptures and dislocations at a flabbergasting cost to the nation.”). 
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on Competitiveness delineating obstacles to a competitive economy and 
outlining proposals for civil justice reform.159  
Ironically, the only direct legislative product of the Bush-Quayle attempt for 
reform of civil litigation in federal courts was then-Senator Biden’s handi-
work: the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.160 
With the election of a Republican majority in Congress in the 1994 mid-
term elections, Congressman Newt Gingrich became Speaker of the U.S. 
House of Representatives and the chief spokesperson for the conservative 
civil justice reform movement.161 Newt Gingrich proposed a “Contract with 
America” that was signed by three hundred Republican legislators; the 
document criticized an overly-litigious society, and called for drastic 
legislative measures to restrict access to courts and deter plaintiffs from 
filing suit. 162  While the effort had rhetorical effect, it generated little 
legislation,163 except for the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, which created heightened pleading requirements and imposed auto-
matic discovery stays in securities lawsuits.164 
Reformers painted a portrait of American civil litigation extrapolated 
from memorable anecdotes or isolated problems.165 Setting aside much of its 
falsity,166 this antilitigation narrative found and still enjoys traction. De-
monizing plaintiffs, lawyers, juries, and the legal system has been an 
effective strategy for corporate America. Citizens, politicians, law students, 
lawyers, and judges have internalized the notion that the civil litigation 
process was (and still is) “out of control.”167  
 
159 Linda S. Mullenix, Strange Bedfellows: The Politics of Preemption, 59 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 837, 847-48 (2009). 
160 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
161 Mullenix, supra note 159, at 849. 
162 See NEWT GINGRICH, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REPRE-
SENTATIVE NEWT GINGRICH, REPRESENTATIVE DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUB-
LICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 144-45 (1994) (discussing why the fact that “[w]e sue each 
other too often and too easily . . . carries high costs for the American economy”). 
163 See generally David S. Broder, When Unity Becomes Division: Party’s ‘Contract With America’ 
Is Now a Footnote, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1996, at A1 (highlighting the Republicans’ failure to enact 
much of the “Contract with America” legislation). 
164 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 § 101, 109 Stat. 
737, 738-40 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally Mullenix, supra note 
159, at 852 (citing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as the only Gingrich civil justice 
reform initiative enacted during the Clinton presidency). 
165 See generally Stempel, supra note 59. 
166 See infra notes 276-80 and accompanying text. 
167 Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and 
Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1116-32 (2012) (offering extensive citations in a section titled 
“Explaining the Resilience of the Cost-and-Delay Narrative”).  
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D. Conservative Ideology 
 Substantial segments of the population favor withdrawing the social 
safety net installed by the New Deal and the Great Society.168 These 
individuals, who passionately believe in free market solutions, also despise 
the growth of tort law and the dozens of federal statutes granting private 
rights of action. 169 One might offer as something of a caricature that 
conservatives’ “Plan A” was to dismantle the “welfare state” and its “social-
ist” policies. “Plan B” might have been to achieve, through amendments to 
procedural rules and procedural statutes, what was harder to achieve 
substantively. “Plan C” might have been to undermine the procedural 
platform upon which substantive rights rely, but to have done so through 
the back door—incrementally, through judicial decisions.170 The fourth era 
demonstrates that Plan C worked.171 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the concern of conservatives about the 
political, economic, and social condition of the country intensified.172 They 
were especially frustrated by the liberal capture of law schools and public 
interest legal organizations.173 Even when conservatives won at the voting 
 
168  See generally CONSERVATISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
THOUGHT FROM DAVID HUME TO THE PRESENT (J. Z. Muller ed., 1997); ROBERT NISBET, 
CONSERVATISM: DREAM AND REALITY 35-36, 50-52 (1986) (“[M]ost forms of equality—or 
better, of mechanisms of achievement of equality—seem to the conservatives to threaten the 
liberties of both individual and group . . . .”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a 
Character: The Moral Agendas of Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 
240-41 (1996) (“A modern conservative hybrid . . . reflects the . . . notion of providing for the 
general welfare so that people could flourish, in favor of withdrawing public safety nets and 
insisting people rely on themselves.”); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The 
New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 35-
36 (1999) (“[T]hese principles include scaling back the welfare state . . . .”). 
169 See, e.g., DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES 4, 216-17 (1993) (discussing Colonel 
McCormick’s hatred of Roosevelt and the New Deal); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER 49-50 
(2010) (noting Cardozo’s view of a judge’s role as “respecting precedent but . . . always serving 
the public good”). See generally LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 
1974–1980 (2010); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVE-
MENT, THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008). 
170 See supra notes 42-52 & 84-90 and accompanying text. 
171 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1582 (2014) (presenting quantitative evidence of the influence of ideology on 
Supreme Court decisionmaking in cases involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
172 See Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for Improving 
Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2208 (2013) (noting the conservative backlash against 
federally funded legal services).  
173 See TELES, supra note 169, at 31-46 (discussing the rise of legal aid and the transformation 
of law students and curricula); Charn, supra note 172, at 2209-11 (“The culture in the 1960s 
supported an overtly political agenda for ‘a new breed of lawyers . . . dedicated to using the law 
as an instrument of orderly and constructive social change.’”). 
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booth, as they had in the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan years, they felt 
stymied by federal judges who were educated by liberals.174 As a counter-
movement, in the 1970s, conservatives founded the Pacific Legal Founda-
tion;175 and with the backing of conservative foundations in the 1980s, 
conservatives invested in their own public interest law firms and think 
tanks.176 The anti–big government, anti-regulation, anti-judicial-expansion-
of-rights, free-market ideology that animated the conservative legal move-
ment was not unique to the United States. Daniel Yergen and Joseph Stani-
slaw explained in exquisite detail how the end of the Cold War and the 
defeat of Russian communism heralded a global attack on large government 
and regulation.177  
In 1981, a couple of brave conservative law students at the predominantly 
liberal Yale Law School decided that they needed a way to connect with 
other conservatives.178 Antonin Scalia, then a professor at the University of 
Chicago Law School, put them in touch with similarly-minded law students 
there, and together these students planned the first conference of the 
Federalist Society, at Yale, in 1982.179 Today, there are student chapters of 
the Federalist Society at every law school in America in addition to sixty-
five lawyer chapters spread throughout the country and Europe.180 
Four of the five justices who constituted the majority in Iqbal were 
members of the Federalist Society.181 Moreover, when conservatives become 
 
174 See TELES, supra note 169, at 56-61 (noting the spread of legal liberalism in the courts). 
175 See Cara Sandberg, Getting Parents Involved in Racially Integrated Schools, 2012 BYU EDUC. 
& L.J. 449, 477 n.195 (citing Mark Tushnet, Op.-Ed., Who’s Behind the Integration Decision? It’s the 
Pacific Legal Foundation, Champion of Right-Wing Causes for 35 Years, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2007, at 
19, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-tushnet7jul07,0,3003625.story) 
(noting that the Pacific Legal Foundation was created after Justice Lewis Powell, in 1971, wrote a 
memo to a friend worrying that liberal groups had nurtured specialist lawyers and litigation 
strategies to defend government regulation; in response, the business community helped create 
not-for-profit law firms, like the Pacific Legal Foundation, to argue conservative perspectives). 
176 See TELES, supra note 169, at 60-89 (discussing the origin of conservative public interest 
organizations).  
177 See generally DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS—
THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE 
MODERN WORLD (1998). 
178 TELES, supra note 169, at 56-61. 
179 See generally id. at 137-80 (discussing the background and foundation of the Federalist 
Society); George W. Hicks, Jr., The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard 
Law School Student Body, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 646-50 (2006) (discussing the 
founding of the Federalist Society at Yale). 
180 For a history of the founding and growth of the Federalist Society, see generally TELES, 
supra note 169, at 137-80. 
181 See generally Michael Avery, Book Review: The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement, 65 
GUILD PRAC. 37, 40-41 (2008) (noting the influence and connection of the Federalist Society with 
the Supreme Court members). 
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federal judges, they often invoke Federalist Society connections and ac-
quaintances to find their judicial clerks. Federalist Society members then 
find their way into federal administrative agencies and into high positions in 
the executive branch.182 The Federalist Society powers a revolving door 
between and among the executive and judicial branches, think tanks and law 
firms, and law school faculties.183  
Conservative ideology in law schools found a new energy resource with 
law and economics. Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of the Law, published 
in 1972, brought economic thought to bear on virtually every legal field.184 
The movement’s emphasis on wealth maximization and efficiency fits easily 
into, and readily supported, the conservative agenda to reduce regulation 
and curtail civil litigation.185  
The Olin Foundation grew into a hundred-million dollar fund in the 
1980s as a result of an inheritance given by the successful businessman John 
M. Olin. Its director, James Pierson, noted that the Federalist Society had 
given voice to conservative law students, observing that “[t]he Law and 
Economics thing now seemed like a way to work on the faculty side and the 
curriculum.” 186  Pierson is candid about using law and economics as a 
conservative entry into the law school world: 
If you said to a dean that you wanted to fund conservative constitutional 
law, he would reject the idea out of hand. But if you said that you wanted to 
support law and economics, he would see that as a program with academic 
content and he would be much more open to the idea. Law and economics 
 
182 TELES, supra note 169, at 158. 
183 See id.; Terry Carter, The In Crowd: Conservatives Who Sought Refuge in the Federalist Society 
Gain Clout, 87 A.B.A. J. 46, 48 (2001) (discussing the influential position of society members); 
Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on the Federal Judiciary, 62 PUB. 
RES. Q. 366, 366-68 (2009) (same). 
184 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007) (1973); RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); see also Richard A. Posner, The Ethical 
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 
502-06 (1980) (noting the efficiency of common law); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, 
and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 105 (1979) (discussing wealth maximization as distinct 
from utilitarianism). 
185 Judge Posner has made clear that he understands that there is more to determining justice 
than economics and efficiency. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply 
to Malloy, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1988). Moreover “many of the [law and economics] field’s 
most prestigious practitioners are quite liberal . . . . That said, there can be no doubt that many 
conservatives, especially foundation patrons, saw in law and economics a powerful critique of state 
intervention in the economy . . . .” TELES, supra note 169, at 90. 
186 Id. at 188; see also Sidney Blumenthal, Quest for Lasting Power: A New Generation is Being 
Nurtured to Carry the Banner for the Right, WASH. POST, Sep. 25, 1985, at A1 (describing the 
conservative’s plan to nurture “a new generation of youthful cadres”). 
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is neutral, but it has a philosophical thrust in the direction of free markets 
and limited government. That is, like many disciplines, it seems neutral but 
isn’t in fact.187 
E. The Federal Judiciary 
Robert Bork was an avid supporter of the Federalist Society from its 
inception, and his jurisprudence was as aggressive as it was erudite. An 
AFL-CIO study released “during the [Supreme Court] confirmation 
controversy found that in seventeen of seventeen access cases in which the 
judges disagreed, [D.C. Circuit Judge Bork] voted to keep the plaintiff out 
of court.”188 His failed confirmation for the Supreme Court appointment in 
1987 angered many conservatives and mobilized a very successful effort to 
stock the federal judiciary with conservatives.189 
Some of the attempts to constrict civil litigation took place through 
rulemaking at the Advisory Committee, Standing Committee, and Judicial 
Conference levels even before reaching the Supreme Court on the way to 
acceptance or rejection by Congress.190 Generally speaking, the chairpersons 
and members of the key rulemaking committees are appointed by the Chief 
Justice; the last three Chief Justices have been appointed by Republican 
presidents. Since 1985, about eight of the thirteen members of the Advisory 
Committee have been members of the federal judiciary.191 In contrast, the 
original Advisory Committee had no sitting judges and was composed of 
nine lawyers and five law professors.192 Professor Stempel’s research on the 
2000 discovery amendments demonstrated how appointments to the 
Advisory Committee tended to be judges nominated by Republican 
 
187 TELES, supra note 169, at 188-89. See generally JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGA-
DO, NO MERCY: HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED 
AMERICA’S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996). 
188 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO 
REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION 129 (1988). 
189 See Mullenix, supra note 159, at 843 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2008, at 38) (“[The transformation of the Supreme Court] was no accident. It represents 
the culmination of a carefully planned, behind-the-scenes campaign over several decades to change 
not only the courts but also the country’s political culture.”); see also Has The Supreme Court Limited 
Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 111th Cong. 316 
(2009) (comments of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse). 
190 For background on the rulemaking process, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
191  Past Members of the Rules Committees, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/archives/past-committee-members.aspx. In 1966, 
there were three judges, four academics, and ten practitioners on the Advisory Committee. 
Starting in 1985, the judges were increased to four and the number of practitioners reduced to six. 
Id. 
192 Subrin, supra note 13, at 971.  
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presidents and lawyers with long-standing affiliations with the business 
community.193 Records of the Advisory Committee meetings since 1970 
reveal considerable sympathy to reform efforts that would (or did) restrict 
access to courts and limit discovery.194  
Ironically, at the same time that the fourth era was institutionalizing an 
anti-trial, anti-litigation, and anti-plaintiff bias, and even as these conserva-
tives railed against administrative agencies, the federal judiciary itself was 
becoming more bureaucratic and more agency-like. 
[A] three-decade expansion program . . . has resulted in the creation of a 
fourth tier within the federal judiciary, comprised of magistrate and bank-
ruptcy judges. The workforce within the federal judiciary has in turn been 
augmented by the expansion of the aegis of the administrative judiciary. 
Together, magistrate, bankruptcy, and administrative judges shoulder a pro-
portion of the federal docket numerically far larger than that of the life-
tenured judiciary.195 
Moreover, judges can delegate a portion of their judicial duties to an expand-
ing number of senior judges, law clerks, staff attorneys, and externs.196 Federal 
judges today spend significant time supervising their staffs. As Judge Posner 
described in 1985, upon review of the astounding growth in the number of 
non-Article III employees in the federal judiciary, judges have become 
 
193 Stempel, supra note 59, at 612-37 (“At the metaphorical end of the day, the proposal to 
limit discovery scope is explained less by the cerebral power of an idea whose time has come and 
more by the political structure of the rulemaking process and the socio-political structure of the 
elite bar and the current federal bench, particularly conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist, who 
selects the Advisory and Standing Committees.”). 
194 Stempel, supra note 59, at 542-52. Yet attempts to formalize more rigorous pleading re-
quirements failed. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1490-96 (describing deliberations around 
pleading standards in the early twentieth century). 
195 Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and 
Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605 (1998). 
196 See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456 
(1983) (“The proliferation of staff and subjudges and the delegation of power to them weaken the 
judge’s individual sense of responsibility.”). On the important role assigned to senior judges, see 
Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices 
Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93 
(2012) (noting that, in 2009, senior district judges accounted for 21.2 percent of case terminations 
and 26.8 percent of all trials). 
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administrators instead of decision-makers.197 He even predicted this bureau-
cracy would be put to the task of avoiding trials.198 
Professor Resnik has recognized the construction of a “corporate identi-
ty of the federal judiciary.”199 She describes how “[d]uring the course of the 
twentieth century, the federal courts became an agency, [meaning] an entity 
that not only organizes itself but also represents—and in practice defines—a 
set of interests.”200  The judiciary has furthered these interests in two 
important respects. First, as an educational and rulemaking organization, 
the federal judiciary has adopted an anti-adjudication and pro-settlement 
agenda.201 Second, in what may seem perverse in light of the increasing 
caseloads and the pressing demand for some meaningful response thereto, 
the federal judiciary, as a lobbying organization, has formally and consist-
ently opposed expanding the number of Article III judges.202 
 
197 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 27-28 (1985) 
[hereinafter POSNER, CRISIS AND REFORM]. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996). 
198 POSNER, CRISIS AND REFORM, supra note 197, at 66-67 (“One response of district 
judges to workload pressures might be to make it more difficult for litigants to get a trial—since a 
trial takes more time than disposing of a case before trial—by granting motions to dismiss and 
motions for summary judgment more freely and by putting more pressure on the parties to settle 
their case before it gets to trial.”). 
199 Resnik, supra note 105, at 949. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 995. 
202 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE’S 1991 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, reprinted in THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 2 (“[A] federal judiciary 
rising above 1,000 members will be of lesser quality and could be dominated by a bureaucracy of 
ancillary personnel.”); Resnik, supra note 105, at 984-86, 1020-21 (recognizing that many judges argued 
against expansion of the federal judiciary to preserve selectivity and minimize inconsistencies). 
Professor Resnik, alluding to Weber, has noted that the federal judiciary, like other bureaucra-
cies, generated “agendas for its own growth.” Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally 
and Legally): The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823, 842 
(2012). She explores the phenomenon of the enormous expansion of federal courthouse space, 
often in exquisite buildings designed by renowned architects, at the same time the Rehnquist court 
was restricting the ability of ordinary citizens to successfully litigate in federal courts. See id. at 
926 (identifying “a tension between the reluctance of Chief Justice Rehnquist . . . to license 
federal court power and the expansion, during his tenure, of federal administrative power 
measured in term of staff, search, rule making, and courthouses”). Beautiful courtrooms increased; 
trials dramatically decreased. Id. at 903-04. She suggests that this irony may be explained by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s wearing two different hats, each with its own agenda. Id. at 927 
(discussing Rehnquist’s position as the chair of the Judicial Conference and as part of a bureaucra-
cy able to generate agendas). As a Supreme Court Justice deciding cases, he had a conservative, 
anti-access agenda; as the head of the Federal Judiciary, he fought for building expansion and 
improvements, often at the urging of other federal judges. Id. at 926-27. The fact that federal 
congressmen wanted beautiful, large courthouses in their own districts, named after prominent 
politicians, helps explain—according to Professor Resnik—how Congress appropriated funds for 
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F. Other Contributing Factors 
We have approached the task of crafting a preliminary history of the 
fourth era with some trepidation. We appreciate that there may be no 
comprehensive explanation for such a broad and profound transformation. 
We conclude this part by simply outlining some additional factors that may 
have contributed to this phenomenon.  
First, the criminal docket has put pressure on the civil docket. This may 
well be true, but the data is less compelling than the conventional wisdom 
suggests.203 Between 1962 and 1975 (a period of time during which the civil 
docket doubled204), the total number of criminal defendant dispositions 
increased by a factor of 1.5.205 Between 1975 and 1983 (when the civil docket 
doubled again206), the total number of dispositions in criminal cases de-
creased.207 To be sure, however, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 required 
criminal cases to be terminated within sixty days of arraignment, adding 
pressure on judges and lawyers trying to handle the burgeoning civil 
caseload.208 
Second, the changing mix of cases in the civil docket may help explain 
the diminution of trials. For example, in 1962, more than one-third of the 
civil filings were tort cases, cases especially likely to go to trial.209 By 1982, 
tort cases had dropped to just seventeen percent of the total civil filings.210 
 
the courthouse building splurge at the same time they refused to grant salary increases to federal 
judges. Id. at 933.  
There may be a psychological component to building magnificent spaces while the major 
reason for a structure is distorted, diminished, or eliminated. In the famous story by H.G. Wells, 
The Pearl of Love, the king wishes to memorialize his beloved, deceased queen with a magnificent 
architectural gem, but finds that the queen’s sarcophagus detracts from the glorious design. H.G. 
WELLS, The Pearl of Love, in SHORT STORIES 162, 164-66 (1924). The story ends with the king’s 
order: “Take that thing away.” Id. at 166. 
203 See John B. Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, Does Criminal Diversion Contribute to the 
Vanishing Civil Trial?, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 443, 469 (2013) (finding little evidence to support the 
popular notion that the criminal docket explains the vanishing civil trial). 
204 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
205 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 102, at 420 tbl.D-4; 1962 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 32, at 234 tbl.D-4. 
206 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
207 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.D-4 (1975–1983). 
208 The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(f )  (2012). 
209 1962 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 147 tbl.C-2. 
210 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 216 tbl.C-2 (1982). 
Interestingly, since 1992, tort cases have regained a significant share of the mix of cases. In 2011 
and 2012, tort cases comprised twenty-nine, and twenty-five percent respectively, of the overall 
civil caseload. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: 
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Types of cases that, at one time, gave young lawyers valuable litigation 
experience largely disappeared from the civil docket because of no-fault 
insurance or other insurance coverage.211 
Third, the changing composition of the bar may help explain some of 
the indifference to trying cases. The trial bar used to be heavily populated 
by street-smart, feisty sons of immigrants, most of whom could not get jobs 
in the more prestigious Yankee firms.212 The growth of larger law firms in 
the 1970s and 1980s generated demand for smart, aggressive young lawyers; 
furthermore, more progressive attitudes toward race, national origin, and 
ethnicity brought more of these talented, newly-minted lawyers into the big 
firms. This social progress may have redirected talented and trial-friendly 
lawyers into positions where cases were not tried.213  
Lastly, some cases can be either too expensive or too risky to try. The 
expanding reach and operations of corporations have increased their poten-
tial to cause more harm to more people in more places.214 Moreover, 
scientific advances have expanded our understanding of the dangers of toxic 
 
MARCH 31, 2011 tbl.C-2 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/ 
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2011/tables/C02Mar11.pdf; 2012 FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/ 
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/C02Mar12.pdf. 
Although the number of trials has decreased significantly in the transition from the third to 
the fourth era, the percentage of jury trials as opposed to bench trials has increased significantly. 
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
211 See, e.g., Randall Bovbjerg, The Impact of No-Fault Auto Insurance on Massachusetts Courts, 11 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 325, 359-60 (1976) (noting that it is “completely clear” that no-fault 
insurance in Massachusetts has “significantly reduced the courts’ civil caseload”); see also DEBO-
RAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE 
STATISTICS, THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 8 tbl.2.1 (1987) (showing declines in the 
percentage of auto cases filed in both state and federal courts); Nora Freeman Engstrom, An 
Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise”, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 303, 368-69 (2012) (citing 
studies between 1970 and 2005 that show a decline in auto filings per year). 
212 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA 184-85 (1976) (chronicling how immigrants and religious minorities entered 
the legal profession against stiff resistance from the establishment). 
213 See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS 116-58 (2008) (recounting the instructive 
story of Joe Flom, a named partner at Skadden, Arps, including how he could not get a job in the 
large Yankee firms in New York); Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1803, 1844-45 (2008) (describing the paradigm shift in the underlying ideology of 
large law firms); Abe Krash, The Changing Legal Profession, D.C. BAR (Jan. 2008), 
http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/january-2008-law-
changes.cfm (recognizing a significant increase in the employment opportunities for black law 
graduates since the 1950s). 
214 See Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the 
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 119 (2009) (noting that “[t]he 
large scale reach of corporations today have the potential to inflict tremendous harm on individu-
als, the environment, and the international community”). 
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products like asbestos, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals.215 Cases involving very 
high stakes may be too risky for either party to try; and complexity may 
fuel the judges’ inclination to manage their cases more aggressively and find 
ways to get rid of them altogether.216 Meanwhile, at the other extreme—
cases where the stakes are relatively small—litigation may be too expensive 
for either party to try.  
III. EVALUATING THE FOURTH ERA 
There is no established scorecard for evaluating a procedural system. We 
propose the following four questions: (1) Does the system vindicate the 
rights and assign the responsibilities prescribed by substantive law? (2) 
Does the system engender a sense of fairness and legitimacy both for its 
participants and for society? (3) Does the system pursue the first two 
objectives efficiently? (4) Does the system reflect the underlying structural 
values of the society?  
A. Procedure’s Instrumental Purpose 
While “some substantive laws may be merely aspirational or symbolic,”217 
“[t]he best laws in the world are meaningless unless they can be meaningfully 
enforced.”218 It surely follows that meaningful enforcement requires that the 
relevant facts be ascertained before the law is applied to them.219 According-
ly, one way of measuring the extent to which procedure is fulfilling its 
instrumental purpose is to evaluate when cases are resolved and the extent 
to which the facts are then fully known. 
 
215 See generally Deborah Young, Introduction to Symposium, The Impact of Science and Technol-
ogy on the Courts, 43 EMORY L.J. 853 (1995). 
216 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 559 (2007) (“Probably, then, it is only 
by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to 
avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery . . . .”); McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 
611, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The required level of factual specificity rises with the complexity of 
the claim.”). 
217 Main, supra note 92, at 822 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-7 (rev. 
ed. 1969)); see also John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 246 
(1990) (“[S]ome legislators will propose or support symbolic legislation such as section 112 [of the 
Clean Air Act] because it minimizes political costs and maximizes political credit.”); James N. 
Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of 
Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (1978) (recognizing the importance of 
aspirational conduct in the legal system). 
218 Jean R. Sternlight, Dispute Resolution and the Quest for Justice, 19 EXPERIENCE 14, 15 
(2009). See generally Baumann, Brown & Subrin, supra note 89. 
219 See generally Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an 
Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981 (2004). 
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Let us first establish the baseline.220 In 1962, in the midst of the third 
era, eleven percent of all terminated civil cases were tried.221 A trial is 
probably the ideal for applying the law to facts that are fully known: law 
professors, lawyers, judges, and mediators consistently use trial outcomes as 
the baseline for determining the value of cases. In the eighty-nine percent 
of cases that were not tried, we must speculate as to how fully the facts were 
known prior to termination. Yet we know that if a factual record was not 
developed at the time of settlement, it was both parties—not a judge, nor 
even the threat of judicial action—who agreed to forego any further investi-
gation into the facts. 
 The large percentage of cases resolved without any court action in 1962 
(fifty-three percent222) also dilutes what is already an impressively high 
percentage of cases that are tried. If one removes the cases resolved without 
any court action from the denominator, the trial rate jumps from eleven 
percent to twenty-four percent. Thus, in nearly one in four cases where 
judges in the third era did anything, they also tried the case. It is instructive 
that seminars for federal judges in 1961 taught judges how to juggle the 
demands of simultaneous jury trials.223  
Now we turn to our most recent figures from the fourth era—2012 data. 
We know that only one percent of all terminated civil cases were tried, and 
we know that the other ninety-nine percent of cases were terminated by 
dismissals, summary judgments, and settlements.224 Some scholars have 
posited that the absence of trials is evidence that the liberal discovery 
regime of the third era has worked so well that there is no need for trials.225 
To be sure, trial is not the only way to unearth all of the relevant facts prior 
to the application of law; indeed, that was our experience in the third era. 
Yet the data suggest that the fourth era does not improve—and in fact 
detracts from—the instrumental purpose of procedure. First, dismissals at 
the pleading stage deny plaintiffs access to discovery; indeed, avoiding 
 
220 See supra Part I. 
221 See supra note 32. 
222 See supra note 38. 
223 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON PROCEDURES FOR EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION, 29 F.R.D. 191, 268 (1961) (“It is common for a judge to have one jury out 
deliberating in a case, while he is trying the next case, and, on occasion, a judge will have two 
juries deliberating on their verdict while he is trying a third case.”). 
224 See supra note 78.  
225 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE 
L.J. 522, 548 (2012) (“Because discovery allows such far-reaching disclosure of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each side’s case . . . [it] serves to displace rather than to prepare for trial.”).  
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costly and invasive discovery is often the express justification for dismissal.226 
Of course, the in terrorem effect of a dismissal also leads to settlements that 
are entered into without a full factual record.227  
The fourth era has also invigorated the summary judgment motion. 
Summary judgment poses less of a threat to the development of facts 
because the factual record may (and in most cases should) be developed 
prior to consideration of the motion. Here, our concern is that juries, not 
judges, should be applying the law to that factual record; we are also 
concerned that judges are making value judgments about the sufficiency of 
evidence without the educational benefit of a trial.  
There is an abundance of evidence of cognitive biases and illusions to 
which we know judges are not immune.228 Further, much adjudication turns 
not on the revelation of whether a fact is true or false—for example, the 
traffic light was or was not red. Instead, many contemporary disputes turn 
on nuanced, mixed questions of law and fact—such as unreasonable care, 
proximate cause, intent, material breach, or unfair competition.229 In the 
third era, the integration of law and fact of this sort was the critical task of 
juries; the assignment to juries was not simply to get the facts right, but also 
to tap society’s judgment.230 
 
226 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2009) (discussing concerns about the 
burdens of discovery on the government where the pleadings are too broad); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558-59 (2007) (suggesting the conclusive pleadings are especially 
problematic where the case involves massive factual discovery). 
227 See also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
228 See Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for 
the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 (1986) (perceiving a “systematic discrepancy” between the 
correct answer and the answer intuited through legal judgment); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816 (2001) (“Our study indicates that judicial decision 
making, like the decision making of other experts and laypeople, is influenced by the cognitive 
illusions we tested.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2002) 
(citing studies that have found a consistent bias in human predictions); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 100 (2000) 
(“Although it is possible that judges make better decisions than juries, there is little evidence to 
support this belief.”); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay 
on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 
329, 334 (1986) (stating that the “legal analyst is not given the luxury of time” and thus must make 
decisions based on the “world as we know it, not as we would like it . . . to be”). See generally 
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS (2012). 
229 See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Real-
istic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401-02 (2011) (discussing the importance 
of the citizenry’s role in deciding questions of mixed fact and law).  
230 See id. (“[T]hey are concepts of mixing elements of fact and law that become legitimate 
behavioral norms when the citizenry at large, acting through jury representatives, decides what the 
community deems acceptable.”). 
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The forces that suppress the development of a factual record also un-
dermine fidelity to substantive law in that we may not even know the 
relevant laws that apply when the case is terminated. Lawyers frequently 
discover additional claims and parties during discovery. The drafters of the 
Federal Rules recognized and accommodated this with generous rules 
allowing amendments to pleadings. 231  Obviously, this dimension of a 
procedural system is lost when cases are dismissed for failure to state a 
claim, are settled in light of the threat of such a dismissal, or are never filed 
in light of the threat of a dismissal. 
Finally, if the development of a factual record is an important value, 
one must take account of the jurisprudence of binding arbitration that is 
redirecting cases from courthouses to suburban office parks.232 How many 
of these cases are tried in a fashion that ensures that the law is applied to a 
fully developed factual record? It is troubling that these cases are decided 
not by public officials vetted by a Constitutional process, but rather before 
arbitrators dependent on the business of repeat players.233 Moreover, one of 
the celebrated attributes of arbitration is its potential to streamline the 
resolution of a dispute without obsessing over the subtle nuances and 
needless complexities of the substantive law.234 
B. Procedure’s Inherent Value 
Procedure also guarantees participants that they will be treated fairly 
and with dignity. A procedural system that is evenhanded, impartial, and 
respectful might also reach more accurate decisions; but the treatment of 
litigants is significant for its own sake.235 
 
231 See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CORNELL 
L.Q. 443, 456 (1934) (comparing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing amendments to 
pleadings to foreign and state systems). 
232 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
233 See Developments in the Law: Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (2009) (exam-
ining “the incentives for bias by the arbitrator in favor of the repeat-player corporation”); Richard 
M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 
HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1253-1358 (2001) (discussing the potential bias caused by the repeat player 
phenomenon); Sternlight, supra note 86, at 1650 (discussing arbitration selection bias). 
234 See Main, supra note 86, at 366-72 (discussing the flexibility of substantive law in ADR 
regimes). 
235 See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (Melvin J. Lerner ed. 1988); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and 
Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20-27 (1974); John 
Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541 (1978). 
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At the core of our due process clause is the right to be heard.236 Dismissals 
at the pleading stage diminish that right. Reduced or eliminated discovery 
deprives parties of facts they need in order to have a fair hearing, and 
summary judgment motions limit access to trials. 
Moreover, many motions (including some dispositive motions) no 
longer receive oral argument.237 Written papers deny an attorney or an 
unrepresented party the opportunity to speak to the judge and directly 
answer questions about the judge’s concerns.238 Because humans cannot 
skim oral presentations, it is easier to get and keep someone’s attention 
when you can speak directly to them. There is abundant evidence on how 
difficult it is to alter preconceived notions and prejudices.239 The vividness 
and drama of a trial, including oral testimony, materially enhance the 
possibility that the factfinder will comprehend the entirety of the litigated 
situation and be more open to diverse viewpoints.240 We understand reality 
through narratives.241 Though narratives can be written, there are reasons 
why attending the performance of a play is different than merely reading 
 
236 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 229, at 401 (calling the right to be heard “the core of 
the process of law”); Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: 
The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 451 (1974) (discussing the 
“sanctity of the right to . . . hearing”). 
237 See Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of 
Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 535 (2006) (discussing effects of “the 
cut-backs in oral arguments”); Eugene R. Fidell, A Modest Proposal, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 22, 2008, at 
23 (discussing “[t]he temptation to dispose of matters entirely on paper . . . without laying eyes on 
counsel”). 
238 See Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A District 
Judge’s Perspective on their History, Function, and Future, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 247, 262-64 
(2009) (discussing the unique benefits of hearing oral argument on dispositive motions). 
239 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2013). 
240 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 765 n.182 (1989) (citing 
ROBERT NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS 
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 45 (1980) (“Vivid information is more likely to be stored and remem-
bered than pallid information.”)); Rebecca M. Todd, Psychophysical and Neural Evidence for 
Emotion—Enhanced Perceptual Vividness, 32 J. NEUROSCIENCE 11201, 11201 (2012) (“Anecdotal and 
empirical evidence suggests that emotionally important events hold a special place in memory, 
where they are bestowed with a unique and vivid character.”). See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, 
THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 121-123, 135 (2009) (discussing the effect of the growth 
of summary judgment). 
241 See Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 
709-16 (1994) (explaining the powerful impact of legal storytelling); Steven L. Winter, The 
Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2225, 2225 (1989) (discussing “the role of narrative in law”). 
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it.242 A hearing also forces the decisionmaker to appreciate that the law 
affects real people in palpable ways. 
This combination of the loss of both orality and trials is directly related 
to the question of whether the fourth era engenders a sense of legitimacy 
from the population. As Senator Whitehouse stated, juries can force 
powerful members of society to appear on equal footing with the less 
powerful; by being a thorn in the side of the powerful, juries ensure the 
integrity of the judiciary’s commitment to equality under the law.243 Accord-
ing to the Founders, juries operate also as an important check or balance 
against the government.244 If fewer citizens have an opportunity to see a 
judge in open court, they may question the importance and the transparen-
cy of the American legal system.245 
Those who disagree with the thrust of this Section might offer four ar-
guments. First, they might say that we are favoring emotions and potential 
jury nullification over an objective application of law to facts. That argu-
ment would require us to accept propositions known to be false: that it is 
possible to be a blank slate, and that judges do not have emotions that 
contribute to their decisionmaking.246 Moreover, it would require us to 
believe that judges hearing motions to dismiss and motions for summary 
judgment are not making judgments of a somewhat subjective nature. The 
fact that the majority opinion in Iqbal instructs district judges to draw on 
 
242 See Marcus, supra note 240, at 762 (“[R]eading a play is a far different experience from 
seeing the play performed . . . .”). 
243 Sheldon Whitehouse, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1519 (2014) (“[T]he civil jury is designed 
to protect the individual against other more powerful and wealthy individuals.”). 
244 Id. at 1518 (“The founders intended the civil jury to serve as an institutional check . . . by 
giving ordinary American people direct control over one vital element of government.”) 
245 See Marcus, supra note 94, at 30 (“I submit to you that what we are talking about is the 
very legitimacy of our judicial system in the eyes of our citizens . . . .”). 
246 See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276, 1281 (2002) (applying cognitive psychology literature to posit that 
judges and juries, like everyone else, are subject to biases and prejudices and advancing strategies 
for overcoming these traits); Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists 
Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 474 (2001) 
(“[B]ehavioralists across the board consistently found it easier to correlate judicial voting behavior 
with measures of the political ideologies of judges than with measures of legal variables.”); see also 
DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED INNOCENT 134-
36 (2012) (demonstrating how, in criminal cases, there is empirical evidence that when juries 
considered the case strong for defendants, judges would convict blacks at five time the rate of 
juries and they appeared to be most satisfied with case outcomes when the composition of the jury 
was all white, as opposed to when at least one-third of the jury was black). See generally STEVEN 
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2002); Timothy 
D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 185 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). 
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their “judicial experience and common sense” puts the lie to that assump-
tion.247 Further, it is important to note here that virtually every study says 
that juries take instructions seriously, and their verdicts are not largely 
divergent from judges.248 
The second objection we might encounter would be that trials are costly, 
and jury trials even moreso.249 We will address the economic arguments in 
the next section, but neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights men-
tions the word efficiency. Moreover, it is impossible to apply law to facts 
without the opportunity, at someone’s expense, to ascertain the relevant 
information. Some values, such as accuracy, human dignity, and judicial 
legitimacy, should weigh heavily on the scale that is balancing concerns 
about efficiency.  
A third objection is that, as Mark Twain, Dean Erwin Griswold, and 
others have said, jurors are often incompetent.250 There are at least two 
answers to that. First, we have always expected good advocacy to include 
the ability to explain complex matters in understandable terms. Second, as 
explained above, the most complex and vexing matters with the inconsistent 
and immeasurable values may be the matters that are uniquely appropriate 
for the public—working in the crucible of narrative, exposure to other 
viewpoints, and cross-examination to weigh and resolve.251 In most cases, 
 
247 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
248 See BURNS, supra note 240, at 93-94 (debating the perception of rising jury awards); 
Robert P. Burns, Some Realism (and Idealism) About the Trial, 31 GA. L. REV. 715, 755 (1997) 
(“[T]he studies tell us that the jury is competent, is deeply engaged with the evidence, and seeks 
to do what seems to do substantive justice.”); see also John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 
SMU L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2001) (citing a 2001 survey that found both state and federal judges to 
be nearly unanimous in “believing that jurors did very well or moderately well in actually reaching 
a just and fair verdict”). See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 
120, 163 (1986) (“A closer look at the jury decision-making process also confirms the jury’s strength 
as a fact-finder.”).  
249 The cost differential between bench and jury trials may be relatively modest. See Stephen 
Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 
614-15 (1993) (reviewing Kalven and Zeisel’s data from the 1950s suggesting that jury trials take 
more time but do not necessarily cost more). But see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to 
the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1502 (1999) (noting that “[t]he direct cost of jury trials 
plainly exceeds that of bench trials”). 
250 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85 (1930) (discussing the 
“basic myth and the jury”); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 145 (2002) (“Lawyers entertain longstanding perceptions of juries as 
biased and incompetent, relative to judges.”). 
251 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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judges and juries reach the same conclusion;252 but in the small percentage 
of cases where they do not, who is to say which factfinder is “wrong”?253 
This leads us to the fourth potential attack on our views: that we are 
hopeless romantics. The older of us has a former student who is now a 
judge; this judge remarked that old trial lawyers once enjoyed “being 
cowboys” in the grand theater of the courtroom.254 Of course, now the 
courtrooms are empty,255 even if the courthouse has not yet closed.256 But if 
it is important to find out what happened in cases, and if the trial is in fact 
most likely to fully explore the relevant narrative, to cross-examine witness-
es, and to force the decision makers to try to be more open to experiences 
other than their own, then it surely is true that trials support the instrumen-
tal purpose of procedure: to ensure that the law is not applied until the facts 
are known. It is also true that trials support the inherent purpose of proce-
dure: to ensure that litigants are treated fairly and with dignity. Further-
more, it is surely not romantic to believe that everyday Americans should 
have the opportunity to impart their own meaning into legally-operative 
words like reasonableness, intent, and fairness.257 Perhaps most importantly, 
if this is all a question of romanticism and nostalgia, we romantics are in the 
good company of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Daniel 
Webster, and many other celebrated Americans, including those who 
enshrined them in the U.S. Constitution.258 
 
252 See supra note 248 and accompanying text (noting that jury verdicts rarely diverge from 
the judge’s). 
253 See supra notes 228, 230 & 248 and accompanying text.  
254 See Jeri Zeder, Where Have All the Civil Jury Trials Gone?, 11 NORTHEASTERN L. MAG. 
14, 43 (2012) (quoting Hon. Carol Ball). 
255 See Young & Singer, supra note 120, at 63 (noting the decline in the number of trials); see 
also Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Re-Presenting Justice: Visual Narratives of Judgment and the 
Invention of Democratic Courts, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 19, 83 (citing U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: BETTER COURTROOM USE DATA 
COULD ENHANCE FACILITY PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING, GAO/GGD-97-39, at 2-3, 
10 (1997) (stating that courtrooms were in use about fifty-four percent of the days when court-
houses were open)). See generally Young, Vanishing Trials, supra note 94. 
256 See generally Miller, Doors Closing?, supra note 4. 
257 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 229, at 401-02 (“[M]any legal norms need community 
input . . . the citizenry at large, acting through jury representatives, decides what the community 
deems acceptable.”). 
258 See BURNS, supra note 240, at 40-68 (discussing the historical importance of trial); NEIL 
VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 16 (2007) (quoting Thomas 
Jefferson on the importance of juries). 
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C. Procedural Efficiency 
The instrumental and inherent purposes of procedure are well worth 
pursuing. But a system committed to those ideals could also chase them so 
vigorously as to undermine them: the system could be so expensive and 
time-consuming, for example, that cases would not be resolved in a timely 
manner, generating unfairness for plaintiffs and defendants and causing 
would-be litigants to lump it rather than file suit.259 The vigorous pursuit of 
one set of values could also flout other important values: privacy, for 
example, is a value at odds with broad discovery and the search for truth.260  
The approach of the third era was to have cases decided on the merits, 
by settlement or by trial, after the relevant facts were uncovered. Each 
judge presided over, on average, twenty to twenty-four trials per year and, 
for the most part, the rest of the caseload took care of itself as parties 
entered into voluntary settlements.261 
However, as the caseloads increased, the judiciary of the new fourth era 
lost faith in this approach and instead relied on judicial case management—
expressly to avoid trials.262 The goal of avoiding trials has been achieved. 
The percentage of civil cases that are tried has fallen from eleven percent in 
1962 to one percent in 2012.263 Even the absolute number of civil trials has 
fallen—from 6202 in 1962 to 3147 in 2012.264 These numbers are especially 
stark in light of the fact that the number of federal district judges has more 
than doubled since 1962.265 
 
259 Much has been written on the “lump it” phenomenon, but the most frequently cited data 
is from the Civil Litigation Research Project. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, 
Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 527-28, 536-44 
(1980-81) (suggesting that ten percent of perceived grievances were brought to a lawyer and only 
five percent to a court); see also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know 
and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 4, 20-21 (1983) (noting that “lawyers are regarded as a last resort”); Michael J. 
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183-90 (1992) (explaining the process of the decision to file a claim). 
260 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1665, 1675-94 (1998) (explaining intricacies and peculiarities of the American procedure regarding 
discovery). 
261 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra note 82 and accompanying text; Part II.B (discussing case management). 
263 See supra notes 32 & 78. 
264 The absolute number of jury trials has also fallen, although less dramatically. Of the 6202 
trials in 1962, 2925 (about forty-seven percent) were jury trials. See supra note 32. Of the 3147 trials 
in 2012, 2205 (about seventy percent) were jury trials. See supra note 78. 
265 See Galanter, supra note 103, at 560 (including a chart that shows the rise in sitting federal 
district judges); see also supra notes 195-202. 
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The number of cases decided “without court action” has fallen from fif-
ty-three percent in 1963 to nineteen percent in 2012.266 Thus, although 
fourth era judges seldom try cases, they are performing some “court action” 
at a rate that is almost three times the baseline amount. This means that, 
assuming everything else were held constant, in thirty-four percent of 
contemporary cases the courts expend precious judicial resources on matters 
that the third era resolved without any court action at all. Moreover, the 
fourth era is no faster at resolving cases than was the third era.267 Query what 
would happen if, instead of engaging in other “court action,” contemporary 
active district judges simply tried cases at the same rate as their 1962 
counterparts—which would generate approximately 13,892 trials per annum. 
This would not only ensure the development of a full factual record in those 
cases, but it might well increase the number of cases settled voluntarily and 
without court action. 
Judicial involvement creates new responsibilities and obligations for the 
parties that were not present in the third era. New scheduling conferences, 
settlement conferences, discovery conferences, and more robust pretrial 
conferences have imposed layers of filing requirements for the parties to 
complete and for the courts to address.268 A prominent study by the RAND 
Corporation in 1996 found that early deadlines and obligations of this sort 
actually increased overall litigation expenditure.269 
The empirical data confirms that there are two types of this sort of case 
management that actually work: setting a firm discovery cut-off date and 
setting a firm trial date.270 But case management in the fourth era has 
included much more judicial interference than this; and what have we 
gained? Potentially meritorious cases are dismissed at the complaint stage or 
by summary judgment.271 Fewer cases are tried.272 Fewer cases settle.273 For 
those cases that do settle, the settlement amounts surely reflect the 
 
266 See supra note 38; 2012 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-4, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/ 
2012/tables/C04Mar12.pdf.   
267 See supra notes 36-38 & 76-77 and accompanying text. 
268 See Young & Singer, supra note 120, at 68 (listing tasks that federal district judges oversee 
today which they did not in the 1950s). 
269 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION 
OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 14 (1996).  
270 Id. at 91. The Report made four recommendations: (1) monitor cases to ensure that dead-
lines for service and answer are met, (2) wait a short period after the joinder date before beginning 
judicial case management to see if a case will terminate, (3) set a firm trial date early, and (4) set a 
reasonably short discovery cutoff time. Id. At 91-92.  
271 See supra notes 39-56 & 71-75 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 31-33 & 77-78; infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 34-38, 71-78 & 254 and accompanying text. 
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pro-defendant bias of a litigation regime where cases are resolved by 
motions instead of by trial.274 The delay factor, except in the big cases, 
remains the same.275 And based upon the ongoing rhetoric, the mega cases 
are still there, still problematic, and still justify reform.  
We can imagine four responses. First, someone who disagrees with us 
might say that we underestimate the effect that these reforms have had on 
keeping frivolous cases out of the court system. But this begs the question 
whether frivolous litigation is a serious problem. The specter of frivolous 
litigation is an important component of the broader narrative about an “out 
of control” litigation system that is the plaything of greedy lawyers and 
their clients. Yet most of the components of that broader narrative are 
demonstrably false: in fact, Americans of the last forty years are not more 
litigious than their ancestors;276 Americans are not especially litigious when 
compared to the citizens of other nations;277 most litigation matters are 
resolved within a reasonable period of time, often in less than a year;278 
there is little or no discovery in many cases, and in almost all cases discov-
ery is commensurate with the amount at stake;279 and punitive damages are 
infrequently awarded, are generally modest in size, and have not increased 
substantially over time.280 To be sure, the fourth era has eliminated some 
frivolous cases that, under the third era, might have gone to trial. But 
eliminating trials altogether (much like closing the courthouse doors) is a 
rather crude way to accomplish this. More importantly, however, there is no 
evidence that frivolous litigation is or has been a serious problem.281 
Second, someone might contend that we underestimate the incredible 
burden on the federal judiciary of the caseload explosion. While it is true 
 
274 See supra notes 53 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra notes 36-38 & 76-78 and accompanying text. 
276 See Galanter, supra note 259, at 36-51 (reviewing data on litigation); Saks, supra note 259, 
at 1206-10 (summarizing data from the National Center for State Courts); see also CHRISTOPHER 
E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 320-22 (2d ed. 1997) (“[L]ong 
term studies cast doubt on the proposition that contemporary Americans are uniquely litigious.”). 
277 See SMITH, supra note 276, at 330 (debunking the notion that the United States is more 
litigious than its foreign counterparts); Galanter, supra note 259, at 51-56 (summarizing compara-
tive data between the United States and foreign jurisdictions). 
278 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.  
279 Thornburg, supra note 35, at 246-49 nn.107-25 (citing and summarizing further empirical data). 
280 See Steven Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 41-42 (1990) (“[T]he median punitive damage award is not at a level that is likely to 
‘boggle the mind.’”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical 
Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996 and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 263, 268 (2006) (“[L]ess than 1 percent of civil actions formally commenced 
resulted in the awarding of punitive damages.”). 
281 See Lonny Hoffman, The Case Against the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2011, 48 HOUS. 
L. REV. 545, 572 (2011) (citing numerous studies). 
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that the caseload expanded dramatically, there is no data that suggests 
judicial involvement is the cure. Indeed, it is management for trial, as 
opposed to management for settlement that works.282 Contemporary data 
demonstrates that those judges who try more cases terminate at least as 
many cases as those judges who try fewer.283 
Third, someone might contend that we underestimate how cultural fac-
tors have made it difficult for lawyers to negotiate on their own without 
substantial judicial involvement. This would be an argument in favor of 
judges helping litigants settle.284 It would not justify the judicial interfer-
ence of the fourth era. 
Finally, critics might suggest that we fail to give the fourth era credit for 
the cheaper, faster, and better alternatives to litigation that ADR offers the 
public. To be sure, ADR has much to offer, and litigants should have the 
option to pursue it. However, courts need not add layers to their own 
processes in order to accommodate or integrate ADR; the likely effect of 
these efforts is simply more expense and delay.285 Our particular concern is 
mandatory arbitration because these litigants are denied access to formal 
adjudication.286 Interestingly, some of the bloom is off the arbitration rose. 
The idea of course is that arbitration offers the possibility of a faster and 
cheaper process by providing the parties with a streamlined procedure, a 
neutral expert, privacy, and limited rights of appeal.287 But empirically, it is 
not at all clear whether or when arbitration is in fact faster or cheaper than 
litigation.288  
 
282 See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
283 See Young & Singer, supra note 120, at 62-67 (discussing court productivity). 
284 See Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much 
Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 207-11 (2003) (listing several of these cultural factors). 
285 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
287 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (citing benefits 
of arbitration as including informality, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and procedural flexibility); see 
also Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 3, 6 (“[I]n terms of 
cost, time, and human wear and tear, arbitration is vastly better than conventional litigation for 
many kinds of cases.”). 
288 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008) (stating that the empirical evidence is too limited to 
draw definitive conclusion about relative costs of arbitration and litigation); Gerald F. Phillips, Is 
Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 38 (2003) (noting that “creeping 
legalism” has made arbitration more costly and a less attractive alternative to litigation); David S. 
Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1268 (2009) 
(assuming, for the purposes of the author’s analysis, that “process costs are, on the whole, less in 
arbitration than litigation,” with the caveat that the author suspects that the “cost savings in 
arbitration are often exaggerated”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 
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D. Procedure’s Consonance with Structural Values 
The civil litigation system is a key part of a larger American political 
structure. That structure includes the three branches of government and 
constitutionally mandated respect for trial by jury.289 Because we have 
already talked at length about the fourth era’s attack on the American 
jury,290 we focus here on each of the three branches of government. 
In the fourth era, the legislature has been assailed in two respects. First, 
the rulemaking process prescribed by the Rules Enabling Act has been 
circumvented.291 Indeed, the changes to federal practice and procedure have 
occurred with essentially no legislative input or public involvement. Second, 
by constricting access to the courts, the fourth era has effectively deregulat-
ed society by undermining the substantive law’s mandate at the enforcement 
stage.292  Moreover, the causes of action that federal courts have most 
frequently targeted are the very causes of action for which Congress incen-
tivizes private enforcement through fee-shifting provisions and awards of 
multiple or exemplary damages.293  
The executive branch has been similarly undermined. Administrative 
agencies pass regulations to be enforced in a manner similar to those 
enacted by the legislative branch. Deregulation by diminished private 
enforcement happens at the executive level as well.  
Finally, perhaps the most dramatic consequence is the impoverishment 
of the status of Article III judges.294 In 1789, the expectation was that 
Article III judges would preside over trials. The contemporary federal judge 
deviates significantly from that ideal: she is largely a bureaucrat who 
manages a staff of adjuncts while only presiding over a civil trial once every 
two or three months on average.295 
 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (citing to literature discussing similarities between commercial 
arbitration and litigation, and referring to arbitration as “the new litigation”).  
289 For an account of the significance of the jury in our constitutional schema, see Suja A. Thomas, 
The Other Branch: Restoring the Jury’s Role in the American Constitution (forthcoming 2015). 
290 See supra notes 31-33, 77, 129 & 155-157 and accompanying text. 
291 See supra notes 43-51, 66-70 & 84-90 and accompanying text.  
292 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
293 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010); Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 (2013). 
294 See generally Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: Federal 
District Judges in the Courtroom, 2008-2012, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 243, 245-47 (2013) (discussing 
the “image” of the federal judge). 
295 See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text. In 2012, there were 3147 civil trials and 673 
authorized district court judgeships. This average of 4.7 trials per district judge per annum is a 
conservative estimate, given that senior judges and magistrate judges are hosting some of these 
trials. See supra note 196. Moreover, this data is premised on the definition of a trial as any 
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IV. ESCAPING THE FOURTH ERA 
If one is inclined to contemplate an escape from the fourth era, we see 
four significant headwinds that would generate resistance: the bench, the 
academy, the public, and the deregulation contingent. Rather than propos-
ing specific reforms (as one of us has done in other scholarship296), we focus 
here on how to strategically navigate a course through each of these four forces.  
A. The Mindset of the Federal Bench 
In the 1970s and 1980s, federal judges, facing burgeoning case loads and 
confronting unprecedented challenges, turned to aggressive case manage-
ment as a solution. But with those especially volatile times behind us, and 
with especially powerful empirical data before us, there is no reason that 
federal judges cannot be convinced that adjustments are in order. Both 
circuit and district court judges need to consider, for example, as some have 
already done, whether it is fair to plaintiffs and consistent with the obliga-
tion to enforce substantive law to dismiss lawsuits because the complaint 
fails to allege facts the plaintiff could not realistically possess.297 Judges 
should further consider whether it is fair to plaintiffs, consistent with the 
substantive law, and respectful to the constitutional right to a jury trial, for 
courts to grant summary judgment in cases where reasonable people do or 
can rationally differ on factual determinations or on the application of a 
legal standard to facts. 
Educational programs might persuade some judges to adjust their judi-
cial philosophy. Judges who set firm discovery cut-offs, firm trial dates, and 
try a great number of cases could spread the word that that approach 
works.298 Obviously, word would spread even faster if these judges were 
included on rulemaking committees, programs of the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts and the Federal Judicial Center, and other platforms.  
We also urge judges to join in the debate over whether the current 
fourth era makes sense. In addition to joining the scholarly dialogue, they 
 
“contested proceeding before a court or jury in which evidence is introduced.” Young & Singer, 
supra note 120, at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FORM JS-10, MONTHLY REPORT 
OF TRIALS AND OTHER COURT ACTIVITY).  
296 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 229, at 408-14 (proposing a simple case track for the 
federal district courts); Stephen N. Subrin, Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure 
and Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 174 (2007) (same); Stephen N. Subrin, The 
Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 394 (2010) (same). 
297 See supra note 94; infra note 306. 
298 See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text. 
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could also share their experiences and opinions.299 Judge Young, for example, 
has asked his colleagues to engage in a conversation about improving court 
productivity measures generally, and the bench presence metric particularly.300  
Judges might also be encouraged to get further insight in their roles. Are 
judges content with the profound evolution of their role from trial judges to 
business managers? They should consider why the public—including 
Congress—should show them great respect and provide ample financial 
support if they are largely business executives at the pyramid of a huge 
bureaucracy that is somewhat disinterested in, or antagonistic to whether 
ordinary Americans can go to court with a realistic opportunity of having 
their rights vindicated.301 
B. The Mindset of the Legal Academy 
Our colleagues in the academy often criticize teachers of procedure 
courses (civil procedure, evidence, pretrial litigation, etc.) for over-
emphasizing traditional litigation in an era when trials are as rare as uni-
corns. We ask those interlocutors to consider the contrary message that legal 
educators convey.  
We increasingly hire to our faculties new colleagues who have not en-
gaged in litigation of any kind, much less trials. For defensible reasons, we 
covet professors with doctorate degrees in subjects like math, economics, 
philosophy, psychology, international relations, and history. The contribu-
tions of these brilliant scholars can be immense, but one must also confront 
the question of whether students who are going to be practicing law should 
be taught by faculty who practiced law. It would help if the law school 
culture did not tout appellate clerkships and positions in huge, prestigious 
law firms representing giant corporations as the major pinnacles of success. 
These large law firms are also the situs of the huge cases—the ugly ten 
percent or so of mega cases where discovery costs are high and delays are 
routine.302 
The employment crisis facing recent law graduates presents an oppor-
tunity to change the dynamics of civil litigation. Young lawyers whose best 
 
299 Might it be beneficial for district court judges to hear more motions on oral argument? 
This would both help focus issues for them and provide experience and valuable courtroom skills 
for lawyers. Should the federal judiciary continue its resistance to increasing the number of 
judges? The federal judiciary could be encouraged to consider whether it should advocate for more 
judges, if needed, and for ways to lower the cost barriers to litigation. 
300 Young & Singer, supra note 120, at 97-98. 
301 See supra Part III.A. 
302 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing discovery in mega cases). 
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option is to start a small or solo practice might charge less to attract clients 
with legitimate grievances.303 If these young lawyers are unwilling to accept 
settlements that do not reflect the litigation’s true value and risk, they might 
find success as lawyers who are actually willing to try cases (that is, assum-
ing they can overcome the hurdles to access imposed by the fourth era). 
This would surely disturb the ecosystem of litigation that has reached an 
equilibrium premised on cases being resolved by motions or on settlements 
under threat of motions. Lawyers, law professors, judges, and friends should 
encourage and help these brave recent graduates to try cases. 
Another important dimension of the academy’s role in causing or rein-
forcing the fourth era is the law and economics movement. This movement 
is no longer the caricature (if it ever was) of a number- and efficiency-
obsessed contingent oblivious to hard-to-quantify values, common sense, 
and the real world. In 2002, the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics was 
awarded to Daniel Kahneman, a behavioral economist who identified the 
role of heuristics in decisionmaking. 304  Moreover, the doubt shed on 
unregulated markets might have already softened the pure efficiency strain; 
now that Judge Richard Posner, one of the leading figures of the law and 
economics movement, has written about the failures of markets and over-
zealous deregulation, one might fairly conclude that one ideology of the 
fourth era is eroding.305  
Law professors can help by collecting and publicizing cases in which 
federal district court judges have carefully reasoned why Rule 12(b)(6) and 
summary judgment motions should be denied, even though in some similar 
cases other judges disagree. Circuit court decisions with reasoned opinions 
denying these motions, even when colleagues disagree, also need analysis 
and distribution. Cases in which trial judges find “plausibility” and deny 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions despite a dearth of factual support—usually due to 
the need for discovery—also need wide publication and study.306 
 
303 Professor Subrin’s research assistant, Jackie Kaplan, suggested that young lawyers might 
be more likely to start their own practice in a struggling economy; they might charge less, attract 
more clients, and even try cases.  
304 See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 239. 
305 See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 319 (2011) (arguing that the 
financial markets must be more heavily regulated to avoid economic crises); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 34 (2011) (arguing that the banking 
industry is inherently risky, but also that it is critical to our economy and thus must be regulated). 
306 See, e.g., Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (reversing a denial of a 
motion for leave to amend); Bagg v. HighBeam Research, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 41, 44 (D. Mass. 
2012) (authorizing limited discovery before considering a motion to dismiss); Harris v. Scriptfleet, 
Inc., No. 11-4561 (SRC), 2011 WL 6072020, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2011) (denying a motion to 
dismiss a Fair Labor Standards Act claim because, reasoning backwards, “[i]t cannot be the case 
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Finally, law professors can seek out and explain empirical data that sheds 
insight on questions about motions to dismiss, motions for summary 
judgment, promises of mediation and arbitration, and judicial involvement 
in discovery.307 Scholars may also take the lead on revisiting the rulemaking 
process.308 
C. The Mindset of the Public and the Legal Profession 
Many of our first year law students tell us that their parents and friends 
have negative reactions to their decision to become lawyers. Included in this 
mindset are the negative stereotypes of greedy plaintiffs, runaway juries, 
and ambulance-chasing lawyers.309 The public is either largely indifferent or 
drawn to the anti-litigation doctrine endorsed by the Supreme Court, 
Congress, and the business community.310 It is instructive that the insurance 
companies in their anti-litigation propaganda used polling data that probed 
the precise contours and depth of this sentiment.311 This may make legislative 
inroads into the fourth era difficult to achieve. Yet there are some encouraging 
signs that the anti-litigation, anti-trial bias could be softening.312 The public 
 
that a plaintiff must plead specific instances of unpaid overtime or minimum wage violations 
before being allowed to proceed to discovery to access the employer’s records”). For a list of 
additional cases, see Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 4, at 344 n.214. 
307 There is enormous room for empirical scholarship dealing with civil litigation. We could 
benefit from carefully collected and analyzed data in a number of areas. What was the actual effect 
of the Federal Rules amendments attempting to control discovery since 1980? What has been the 
impact of adding multiple steps to the litigation process? What state procedural amendments and 
experiments have reduced time and costs? What are the variables that would permit courts and 
judges to try considerably more cases each year without diminution of case terminations? Would 
education of pro se litigants increase their success in court? What is the impact of long distance 
trials using video imaging on lawyer, client, and judge satisfaction? Empirical data on these and a 
myriad of other similar questions would add much needed intelligence to the rules and decisions 
concerning the conduct of civil litigation. 
308 For example, in 1921, the Harvard Law Review published Benjamin Cardozo’s proposal 
for “a Ministry of Justice,” an administrative agency that would combine members of the academy, 
judiciary, and bar to scientifically review proposals for legislation. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, A 
Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113-14, 124 (1921) (“The task of mediation is that of a 
ministry of justice.”). Charles Clark, Cardozo’s contemporary, suggested that the Ministry should 
also study and propose procedural rule modifications. See David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 487-88 n.309 
(2010) (noting Charles Clark’s support for a Ministry of Justice which would formulate procedural 
rules). 
309 See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
311 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 155, at 462 (discussing the insurance industry’s public 
opinion polling regarding civil litigation). 
312 See, e.g., Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. v, v (2004) 
(discussing the American Bar Association’s project investigation of whether the number of jury 
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wants their rights enforced and should therefore support procedures that 
make such enforcement more likely. 
We think the public has been misled, and a counter publicity campaign 
is in order. We would emphasize that substantive law confers a broad range 
of rights—among them being matters of health, safety, consumer protec-
tion, the environment, property rights, civil rights, and so forth. Although 
some interest groups oppose the very existence of each of these rights, those 
interest groups lost that fight. When this happened, attention turned to how 
these rights would be enforced. Among the two basic models for enforce-
ment—public enforcement by the government, and private enforcement by 
the aggrieved individual—the interest groups opposing the very existence of 
the rights generally acquiesced to private enforcement. However, with a 
system now premised on private enforcement, those same interest groups 
are now using procedural reforms to undermine that enforcement. 313 
Lawyers who bring claims to vindicate the substantive rights of individuals 
 
trials is declining and whether this should be a concern); Jonathan M. Judge, Lori Vella & Hudson 
Jones, Ongoing Efforts to Preserve Our Unique Right, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 2012, at 10, 11 
(discussing “the nationwide effort to revive the civil jury trial”); see also AM. COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS, THE “VANISHING TRIAL:” THE COLLEGE, THE PROFESSION, THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2004), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All_ 
Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=57 (explaining its mission of 
reviewing the phenomenon of the skyrocketing number of civil actions, but decreasing number of 
trials); supra notes 195-202, 295, 306 and accompanying text. 
If cases like Twombly and Iqbal have—as we and so many others have argued—gone too far in 
an anti-litigation direction, then members of the legal profession should continue to urge Congress 
to reverse them. For two examples of congressional proposals to reverse Twombly and Iqbal, see 
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Open Access to Courts 
Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). These bills stalled in Congress, and reversal of the 
Court’s decisions seems highly unlikely at this time. However, it took over twenty years, and the 
death of Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana, for the Rules Enabling Act to pass. See Subrin, supra 
note 96, at 2007-11 (discussing Walsh’s opposition to the reform of procedural rules and recounting 
the history of the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act). Times change. It is important to keep 
important issues alive and before Congress. 
Even if legislators do not want to wholly reverse the cases, they could do it partly. If these and 
similar procedural changes are not congressionally mandated for all civil cases, Congress should be 
encouraged to include more rights-enhancing procedures in substantive statutes. For example, 
Congress has added procedural hurdles in substantive areas, such as the securities field. See, e.g., 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006) (requiring plaintiffs to 
provide a sworn certification along with the complaint). Congress could also add procedural 
safeguards, as it has done many times in restoration statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
313 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. 
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are doing something noble, not nefarious. Moreover, the proper enforce-
ment of these laws requires courts to be adequately funded for the task.314  
D. The Mindset of Newt Gingrich and His Ilk 
Political and economic views seem to have always been integral to pro-
cedural reform. The Field Code was imbued with Field’s laissez-faire 
ideology.315 The Federal Rules were, in part, a product of New Deal think-
ing.316 It is unlikely that we can convince deeply-committed conservatives 
that civil litigation to vindicate rights and assign responsibilities according 
to the substantive law is a good thing. But we call these deeply-committed 
conservatives to a debate on what civil procedure should look like and what 
the role of civil litigation should be. If critics of our work agree with the 
values we have outlined, then we can debate how best to balance them. If 
critics of our work do not agree with the values we have offered, then we 
want to know what values they would add or subtract, and where they think 
our analysis is inaccurate, unfair, or flawed. Finally, we hope that the 
“Federal Rules at 75” Symposium, organized by the University of Pennsylva-
nia Law Review, will constitute an important turning point in the history 
and development of federal civil procedure. 
 
314 See generally Inadequate Court Resources Hurt Access to Justice, Say Nation’s Top Jurists, ABA 
NEWS (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/08/ 
inadequate_courtres.html. 
315 See Subrin, supra note 17, at 323-27 (explaining Field’s laissez-faire ideology). 
316 See Subrin, supra note 13, at 969-70 (recounting the events that led to the enactment of 
the Rules Enabling Act and Federal Rules during the New Deal). 
